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Abstract
The Supreme Court has, in recent years, developed a detailed set of rules governing whether cases with tribal
contacts should be heard in a state or tribal forum. It is therefore all the more remarkable that courts
considering such cases have devoted almost no attention to the question of which law should apply once a
forum has been chosen. Instead, courts have broadly assumed, without explicit consideration of the issue, that
the forum in which the case is brought will apply its own law. Where state courts are concerned, two problems
exist with this approach. First, the assumption that state court will apply state law and tribal courts tribal law
puts a too-high premium on the plaintiff 's initial choice of forum, leading to uncertainty and inefficiency.
Second, and more substantively, this approach gives insufficient weight to tribes' sovereign status, because it
fails to consider that tribal standards of conduct may be relevant to deciding cases with tribal contacts. This
article offers at least a partial solution to these difficulties. It argues that, under the choice-of-law principles
followed by most states, tribal law would ordinarily govern many of the cases with tribal contacts that are
heard in state court. Wider application of tribal law in state court might help to address these concerns by
reducing the jurisdictional friction between states and tribes and permitting tribal interests to be more fully
taken into account in deciding cases. Because choice-of-law doctrine is characteristically flexible, it provides
an ideal way to balance the interest of tribes, states, and litigants. Further, state-court application of tribal law
in such situations would not (as some commentators have assumed) conflict with federal law or with tribal
autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, the Supreme Court has decided a series of 
cases purporting to clarify the respective roles of state and tribal 
courts in adjudicating disputes that involve Indian litigants or arise in 
Indian country.  As a result, a detailed set of rules now governs 
whether such suits must be filed in a state or tribal forum.  Since the 
foundational case of Williams v. Lee,1 for example, it has been clear 
that a non-Indian plaintiff whose case concerns an Indian defendant 
and an on-reservation transaction must file suit in tribal court.  More 
recently, the Supreme Court has effectively required that suits against 
a non-Indian arising out of events on privately owned land generally 
must be brought in state court.2  In other situations—for example, a 
lawsuit that involves non-Indians, but arguably concerns core matters 
of tribal sovereignty—the proper choice of forum is a more 
complicated question that may turn on seemingly inconsequential 
facts:  whether, say, the tribe or the state had responsibility for 
maintaining the highway on which an accident occurred,3 or whether 
alleged spoliation of evidence occurred on or off the campus of a 
tribal college.4 
The question of which court should hear cases implicating tribal 
interests thus often requires a complex and technical answer.  It is 
therefore all the more remarkable that courts considering such cases 
                                                          
 1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
 
 2. See generally Robert D. Probasco, Indian Tribes, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts, 7 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 119 (2001) (explaining the jurisdictional rules applicable to 
Indians and non-Indians that depend  upon land ownership). 
 3. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997) (holding that state 
court was proper forum to decide case involving accident occurring on state highway 
running through tribal land). 
 4. See Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit found that the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
could assert jurisdiction over spoliation of evidence claim against a nonmember.  Id. 
at 1135.  Among the factors the Ninth Circuit considered was the degree of the suit’s 
“connection to Indian lands,” which in turn required it to consider where the alleged 
destruction of notes from an accident investigation report occurred.  Id.  The college 
was located on tribal lands; thus, while the record was not clear about where the 
notes had been destroyed, the court nonetheless found that the college “had control 
over the notes” and that their loss or destruction consequently involved “activities 
conducted or controlled by a tribal entity on tribal lands.”  Id. 
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have devoted almost no attention to the question of which law should 
apply once a forum has been chosen.5 Instead, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly suggested that the jurisdictional reach of tribal courts 
is identical to the scope of the tribe’s legitimate regulatory interests;6 
similarly, state courts have often assumed that cases heard in state 
court will necessarily be governed by state law.7  As a result, courts 
have tended to treat the issues of which forum should hear a case and 
which law should be applied to it as if they were a single question—
simply assuming, without explicit consideration of the issue, that the 
forum in which the case is brought will apply its own law.8 
This assumption, to be sure, does not entirely lack foundation.  
Under current jurisdictional rules, cases involving Indians and arising 
on tribal land must generally be heard in tribal court,9 while cases 
against nonmember defendants are usually restricted to state court.10  
Where a case arises in the state forum and involves parties who have 
links to it, most choice-of-law theories would dictate that the forum 
should apply its own law.11 
Further, there are historical and philosophical reasons why tribal 
law and tribal courts should be closely tied together.  Tribal courts 
                                                          
 5. See Katherine C. Pearson, Departing from the Routine:  Application of Tribal Law 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 695, 725 (2000) (noting that in 
federal Indian law cases, courts often focus on “adjudicative authority or jurisdiction” 
to resolve disputes, rather than choice-of-law issues). 
 6. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (“As to nonmembers . . . a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”). 
 7. See Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in Indian Country:  The Confusing Boundaries 
of State, Federal, and Tribal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 558 (1997) 
(explaining that for many state courts, “the presence of substantial off-reservation 
contacts automatically has a two-pronged result:  the state court has adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, and state law applies to the dispute”). 
 8. See Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499, 508 (Ariz. 
1986) (holding that state-court adjudication did not infringe upon tribal self-
government where a supplier sued tribal housing development project surety on 
performance bond); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Bd. of County, 883 P.2d 136, 142 (N.M. 
1994) (holding that despite a federal statute that limited state jurisdiction over 
Indian land, the state court still had jurisdiction to adjudicate preexisting interest in 
land that was purchased and held by a tribe). 
 9. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229 (D.N.M. 2000) 
(underscoring that a significant aspect of tribal sovereignty is that tribal courts retain 
jurisdiction over matters arising on tribal land).  See generally American Indian Law:  
Tribal Court Civil Jurisdiction:  Ninth Circuit Holds That Tribal Courts Lack Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction Over Products Liability Suits Arising On Tribal Land, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2469 
(2005) [hereinafter American Indian Law] (providing historical background on tribal 
court jurisdiction). 
 10. See American Indian Law, supra note 9, at 2469 (“[T]he extent to which tribal 
courts properly exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over suits involving non-Indian 
defendants has remained an unsettled issue.”). 
 11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971) 
(providing that the parties’ domicile and place of relevant events are important 
factors in determining which law to apply in both tort and contract cases). 
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are often an integral part of tribal life; indeed, the federal 
government has supported tribal judicial systems as a primary means 
of fostering tribal autonomy.12  There may also be practical difficulties 
in applying tribal law in nontribal forums.  In some tribes, elders who 
do not speak English administer tribal law;13 in others, the procedures 
tribal courts use to resolve disputes are inextricable from substantive 
law.14 Moreover, many commentators reasonably fear that state courts 
will not give adequate consideration to tribal interests, and that tribes 
and their members are generally better off if disputes involving tribal 
matters are heard in tribal forums.15 
Yet while these arguments have some persuasive force, they fail to 
add up to a conclusive justification for keeping tribal law out of state 
court.  To begin with, the arguments for restricting state-court 
application of tribal law are built on a jurisdictional landscape that 
has changed.  As the Supreme Court has steadily limited tribal 
jurisdiction, it is no longer possible to assume that tribal courts have 
power to hear all cases involving substantial tribal contacts.  Further, 
even where tribal courts have jurisdiction over individual claims, 
under certain circumstances state courts are more likely to have 
jurisdiction over an entire case16—making it more likely that litigants 
will make the reasonable choice to bring all possible claims in state 
court, rather than splitting them between state and tribal court.                           
As a result of these developments, many cases that concern Indian 
litigants and arise in Indian country—cases that were once handled 
by tribal courts—now must be brought in state court if they are to be 
heard at all.  In this situation, concerns about eroding tribal-court 
authority are essentially moot, since the tribal court already lacks 
power to hear such cases.  Moreover, if the state court chooses to 
apply state rather than tribal law, the already-narrowing sphere of 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993)  
(finding that “tribal justice systems are an essential party of tribal governments” and 
providing financial and other forms of assistance to tribal courts). 
 13. See John J. Harte, Validity of a State Court’s Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 21 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63, 91-92 (1997); Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1997) (describing the important cultural role of native 
languages in many tribal judicial proceedings). 
 14. Certain tribes, for example, use a mediation process designed to repair 
relationships between the parties rather than the traditional Anglo-American model 
in which an ostensibly neutral arbiter designates a winner and loser.  See John v. 
Baker, 30 P.3d 68, 76 (Alaska 2001) (describing Northway Tribe’s “mediation-like” 
dispute resolution procedures). 
 15. See Harte, supra note 13, at 91 (arguing that only tribal courts should 
interpret tribal law, and a state court should dismiss cases involving the 
interpretation of tribal law). 
 16. See id. at 69 (“The existence of a non-Indian in a dispute plays a significant 
role in a state court’s decision to accept concurrent jurisdiction over a matter.”). 
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tribal influence will only shrink further.  By contrast, the application 
of tribal law in such circumstances has the potential to promote tribal 
autonomy and self-determination by providing a way in which tribal 
interests can be taken into account even where tribal courts lack 
jurisdiction over a case.17  
Application of choice-of-law principles in cases with tribal contacts 
also has the potential to minimize many of the procedural problems 
that current rules of tribal jurisdiction create. As current doctrine 
stands, the Supreme Court, acting under the assumption that state 
and tribal forums will each apply their own law, has devoted 
considerable attention to developing rules that determine whether a 
case involving tribal contacts should be heard in tribal court or state 
court.18  Because the way in which these rules should apply to any 
given case is often unclear, however, they can cause litigants 
considerable uncertainty.19  Further, these judicially crafted rules can 
often lead to illogical and inefficient results—as when, for example, 
they mandate that a given plaintiff’s claim must be heard in state 
court, while a defendant’s counterclaim must be heard in tribal 
court.20 
Many of these problems could be avoided if the problem of 
allocating cases between state and tribal authority were regarded not 
merely as a forum-selection or jurisdictional problem, but also as a 
choice-of-law one.  Forum-selection rules tend to dictate an all-or-
nothing solution.  Even if a case involves an equal mixture of state 
and tribal contacts, it ultimately must be brought either in state court 
or in tribal court.21  By contrast, choice-of-law doctrine is far more 
flexible and individualized.  Unlike the decision whether to allow a 
claim to be heard in a particular forum, which generally must be 
made at the outset, choice-of-law decisions can be made on a case-by-
case basis and in conjunction with a decision on the merits.22  A 
                                                          
 17. See id. at 91 (considering the implications of applying tribal law in state courts 
given that tribal law is often unwritten). 
 18. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text (providing examples of rules that 
determine whether jurisdiction lies in tribal or state court). 
 19. See Harte, supra note 13, at 102 (pointing out that the extent of the 
application of the rules set by the Supreme Court in this area is still in question). 
 20. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438 (1997).  Under these cases, if a member of a tribe asserted a claim against a 
nonmember in state court, and the nonmember wished to assert a counterclaim, the 
plaintiff’s claim must be heard in state court, while the defendant’s counterclaim 
must be heard in tribal court.  It would also be the case if a tribe member wished to 
counterclaim against a nonmember who sued in state court.  Williams, 358 U.S. at 
217; Strate, 520 U.S. at 438. 
 21. See generally Harte, supra note 13, at 76-98 (providing an in-depth discussion 
of concurrent jurisdiction in tribal and state courts). 
 22. See id. at 92-95 (examining the choice-of-law provisions pertaining to tribal 
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choice-of-law approach is thus both more efficient from a litigant’s 
point of view and more suited to a balanced accommodation of state 
and tribal interests. 
 Moreover, there is little evidence that encouraging state courts to 
apply choice-of-law principles in the tribal context would create the 
practical difficulties that commentators have sometimes feared.  
Although the problems entailed in state-court interpretation of tribal 
law are real, they are also easy to overstate.  It is true that the law of 
certain tribes may be difficult for outsiders to understand or apply.  
Many other tribes, however, rely to some degree on principles of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence familiar to state courts.23  Further, 
well-established mechanisms for negotiating interjurisdictional 
conflicts in general are likely to be equally useful in the tribal 
context; state courts can, for example, certify difficult questions of 
tribal law to tribal courts. 24 Finally, in cases where tribes do not wish 
to have their law applied by outsiders, choice-of-law theory is flexible 
enough to take such preferences into account, thus minimizing the 
risk of undermining tribal authority.25 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I reviews in turn the two 
principal strands of Indian law doctrine, as reflected in Supreme 
Court cases:  first, cases that attempt to foster tribal autonomy; 
second, cases that impose strict limits on tribal regulatory and 
adjudicative power over nonmembers.  Part I then outlines two 
serious problems with the current state of the law:  first, that the 
complex and highly fact-bound set of jurisdictional rules the Court 
has developed leads to uncertainty and inefficiency in choice of 
forum; and second, that the Court’s decisions have given insufficient 
weight to tribal interests. 
Part II examines the possibility that wider application of tribal law 
in state court could help to address these concerns by reducing the 
jurisdictional friction between states and tribes and permitting tribal 
interests to be taken into account more fully.  Part II first sets forth 
the argument that, under prevailing choice-of-law principles, tribal 
                                                          
law jurisdiction). 
 23. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts:  Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. 
L. REV. 225, 250-55 (1994) (discussing some ways in which tribal courts integrate 
traditional and Anglo-American practices); see also Pat Sekaquaptewa, Evolving the 
Hopi Common Law, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 762 (2000) (describing how Hopi 
judges are attempting to develop Hopi law “to ensure a tight fit between Western 
justice models and persisting Hopi ways”). 
 24. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2005) § 7.06[2], at 654 (noting 
that certification is the preferable method for state courts to handle questions of 
tribal law). 
 25. See Harte, supra note 13 (detailing the pertinent choice-of-law provisions). 
FLOREY 9/12/2006  3:46:27 PM 
2006] CHOOSING TRIBAL LAW 1633 
law should be applied more broadly in state court than it generally 
has been. It explores the way in which choice-of-law concepts can be 
adapted to the distinctive features of tribal sovereignty, and discusses 
why such an approach would have advantages over the current one. 
Part III discusses potential objections to the application of tribal 
law by state courts:  first, that it might raise due process concerns; 
second, that federal Indian law might preempt it; third, that 
application of tribal law will inevitably undermine tribal autonomy.  
Rejecting these arguments, this Article ultimately concludes that 
state-court application of tribal law will help state courts to handle 
cases with tribal contacts in a way that is fairer and more 
straightforward—an outcome that will ultimately work to the 
advantage of both litigants and tribes. 
I. A THICKET OF RULES:  TRIBAL-STATE CASE ALLOCATION UNDER 
CURRENT LAW 
While a detailed set of rules governs the allocation of cases between 
state and tribal courts, these rules are not the product of a 
comprehensive body of doctrine or statutory scheme. Instead, most of 
the principles that determine whether a case should be brought in 
state or tribal court are the result of judicially formulated, fact-
specific solutions to the problems presented by individual cases.26  
Taken as a whole, these forum-selection rules often lead, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, to illogical or unexpected results.27 
The seeming chaos of the Supreme Court’s case law is in part the 
product of the two central principles by which the Court has been 
guided, which have often pointed in conflicting directions.  On the 
one hand, the Court has sought to protect tribes’ right to govern 
autonomously, free from state interference.  As a result, the Court has 
sought to ensure that tribal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over 
the cases that seem most likely to implicate core tribal interests.28  At 
the same time that it has sought to protect tribal institutions, 
however, the Court has also at times looked at those institutions with 
suspicion.  Tribal governing bodies and tribal courts are not subject 
to the constraints of the Constitution,29 and perhaps in consequence, 
                                                          
 26. See Harte, supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that choice-of-
law decisions are made on a case-by-case basis). 
 27. See supra note 20 (illustrating the possible results of the jurisdictional rules in 
this context). 
 28. For an extensive discussion of the Court’s present and historical role, see 
Philip Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in American Public Law, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 431  (2005). 
 29. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[T]he existence of the right 
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the Court has been reluctant to allow them to assert authority over 
those who are not voting, participating members of the tribe.  While 
insisting that tribes are more than “voluntary organizations,”30 the 
Court has nonetheless sharply constrained tribes’ ability to govern 
those who have not taken affirmative steps to associate themselves 
with the tribe.31   
As it has sought to promote these two often-conflicting goals, the 
Court has mostly sought to regulate the allocation of cases involving 
tribal contacts through one primary method:  by assigning a case 
either to state court, where state law will presumptively apply, or to 
tribal court, where it will likely be governed by tribal law.  Further, 
the Court has developed such procedural mandates on a case-by-case 
basis, considering only rarely—if at all—how they interact as a whole.  
Therefore, like the contradictory aims they are designed to serve, the 
case-allocation rules the Court has developed often pull in two 
directions.  This Section considers these developments and their 
effects.  
A. Historical Background:  Tribal Autonomy and Geographic 
Fragmentation 
Only fairly recently have procedures for allocating cases between 
state and tribal court become necessary.  Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, tribes generally performed the task of keeping 
order on their lands themselves, using both formal and informal 
judicial processes,32 and state and federal courts were frequently 
willing to recognize and enforce the judgments of tribal courts.33  (By 
                                                          
in Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee 
nation shall be exercised does not render such local powers federal powers arising 
from and created by the constitution of the United States.”). 
 30. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (“The tribes are . . . a good deal 
more than private voluntary organizations, and are aptly described as unique 
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their 
territory.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 31. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 4th Ed. (2004), at 154 
(noting the Supreme Court’s recent focus on tribe membership). 
 32. See Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction Over 
Federal Enforcement of Federal Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 547-48 (1997) (tracing the 
history of tribal judiciaries in the United States); Zuni, supra note 13, at 20  
(characterizing the federal policy before 1871, as “one of respect for tribal self-
government and traditional forms of tribal justice”). 
 33. In United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 102 (1855), the Supreme 
Court held that District of Columbia courts could enforce a tribal court probate 
order on the basis that the tribe was included in the definition of a “territory” under 
the relevant federal probate statute.  See Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments:  A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311, 320 (2000) 
(explaining that many lower courts automatically gave full faith and credit to tribal 
judgments notwithstanding uncertainty as to whether recognition of tribal judgments 
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contrast, only a minority of states today extend automatic or near-
automatic recognition to tribal judgments34).  While federal courts 
sometimes intervened to protect tribes against hostile state 
governments,35 tribes and states had little formal interaction.36   
By the late nineteenth century, however, the federal government 
seized upon the notion of privatizing tribal land as a means of 
reducing tribes’ institutional power and helping to assimilate 
individual Indians into Anglo-American culture.37  In addition, in 
1887 Congress enacted the General Allotment Act,38 which 
authorized grants of reservation land to individual Indians, to be held 
in trust by the federal government for a period of time before passing 
into private ownership.39  Among other significant provisions, the Act 
allowed any remaining reservation land to be made available to non-
Indians; in addition, it made Indian allottees subject to state law.40  
Around the same time, the federal government began to assume 
some of the traditional functions of tribal courts, establishing Courts 
of Indian Affairs that applied federal common law rather than tribal 
law. 41  
While allotment was applied to different reservations to varying 
degrees, the substantial majority of reservation land was ultimately 
                                                          
was required by the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause or its implementing 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which specifically encompasses “territories”). 
 34. See Robert Laurence, The Role, If Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-Boundary 
Enforcement of Federal, State, and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. 1, 16-17 (1999) 
(suggesting that the majority of state courts today find that the constitutional Full 
Faith and Credit clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 do not command state-court 
recognitions of tribal judgments, despite early precedent holding otherwise).  But see 
Leeds, supra note 33, at 332 (noting that New Mexico takes the opposite view, finding 
that the statute’s reference to “territories” encompasses tribal lands).  Overall, most 
state courts grant a measure of deference to tribal judgments that falls well short of 
the automatic recognition they must accord sister-state judgments under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738.  COHEN, supra note 24, § 7.07[2][b],  at 660-62. 
 35. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 36. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 6.01[2], at 501. 
 37. The allotment movement followed a trend that started following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883), holding 
that no jurisdiction existed in federal court over a murder of one Indian by another.  
Following the decision in Crow Dog, the practice of allowing tribes autonomy in 
handling their legal affairs became particularly controversial.  Id.  In response to 
public perception that tribal justice was inadequate in cases of violent crime, 
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885).  The Act granted 
federal courts jurisdiction over a variety of serious crimes in Indian country, 
including those in which the perpetrator and victim were both Indians.  See CANBY, 
supra note 31, at 135. 
 38. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887). 
 39. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.04, at 80-81.  
 40. See id. (noting that the central result of the allotments was a national 
reduction in the amount of Indian-held land). 
 41. See id. (noting that the “primary aim” of such courts was to “end Indian 
culture”). 
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allotted, and much of the allotted land was ultimately sold to non-
Indians.42  By creating a checkerboard pattern of ownership, 
allotment added an element of uncertainty to tribal jurisdiction and 
strengthened the arguments of those who believed that state courts 
and state law should have a role in Indian country.43  The 
checkerboard pattern thus created gave rise to lasting uncertainty 
about the territorial reach of any given tribe’s power. 
In recognition of the difficulties allotment had caused, federal 
policy in the 1930s shifted in a radically different direction.  Federal 
officials began to recognize the virtues of tribal autonomy—not just 
as a default state of affairs, but as a goal towards which to strive.  The 
Indian Reorganization Act of 193444 returned some unallotted land to 
tribal control and provided a structure by which tribes could register 
constitutions with the federal government.45  Many tribes formalized 
their structures of governance in written constitutions and re-
established their defunct tribal courts.46  By the 1950s, however, 
assimilationism had come back into vogue, this time in the form of 
the policy known as “termination,” which was designed to do away 
with tribes as political entities and with reservations as distinctively 
Indian land.47  In many cases, tribes were dissolved, tribal lands were 
sold, and individual Indians were encouraged to relocate to non-
Indian areas.48  Further, in contrast to the program of allotment, 
states—as opposed to the federal government—became a primary 
instrument of weakening tribal political power.  Thus, as part of the 
assimilation process, Congress granted certain states broad 
jurisdiction to decide disputes in Indian country.49  Shortly thereafter, 
Congress provided a more comprehensive grant of jurisdiction in the 
                                                          
 42. See id. § 1.04, at 79 (noting that Indian-held land declined from 138 to 48 
million acres from 1887 to 1934). 
 43. See Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 22 AM. IND. 
L. REV. 65, 74 n.31 (1997) (“[A]s non-Indians moved onto reservations, so too did 
state law.”). 
 44. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934). 
 45. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.05, at 85-86 (highlighting that the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 marked a change in the government’s attitude towards 
the protection of tribes). 
 46. See Leeds, supra note 33, at 324 (noting that tribal courts were eventually 
“revitalized”); Zuni, supra note 13, at 20-21 (mentioning that after the Indian 
Reorganization Act, many tribes adopted model constitutions). 
 47. See id. at 25-26 (explaining that the policy of termination was a radical 
departure from previous policies). 
 48. See id. at 26-27 (asserting that large numbers of Indians relocated to urban 
areas where many were unable to find employment). 
 49. See Robert B. Porter, The Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Iroquois and New 
York State, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 497, 520 n.129 (1990) (listing the five states originally 
granted jurisdiction to decide disputes in Indian country:  California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin). 
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form of P.L. 280,50 which gave five states (California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington, with a sixth jurisdiction—the 
then-territory of Alaska—added in 1958) extensive criminal and civil 
adjudicatory authority over reservations.51 (Later amendments 
permitted other states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country with 
tribal consent, which several states have done, although often to only 
a limited extent52). 
Like allotment, termination was ultimately recognized as a 
failure—a policy that disrupted the fabric of tribal life while failing to 
integrate tribe members, either economically or culturally, into non-
Indian society.53  Starting in the Nixon administration, the federal 
government began to shift back toward autonomy-promoting 
policies—an ideology that has remained more or less in place to the 
present day.54 
At various points, therefore, the federal government has embraced 
two essentially opposite goals55—assimilationism and tribal 
autonomy—and tribal institutions have been influenced not only by 
these conflicting policies but by the way in which the federal 
government has swung back and forth between them.  In periods 
when the federal government adopted pro-autonomy policies, it did 
so in large part by encouraging the development of tribal law and 
tribal institutions, including tribal courts. By contrast, the federal 
government has primarily implemented assimilationist policies in two 
ways—first, by disrupting the geographical integrity of Indian 
                                                          
 50. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953); see COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.07, at 
96-97; discussion infra Part III.B (examining Bryan v. Itasca Country, 426 U.S. 373 
(1976), which gave the civil-jurisdiction provisions of P.L. 280 a fairly restrictive 
interpretation). 
 51. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 1.06, at 95 (explaining that a few Indian 
reservations within the affected states were exempted from P.L. 280’s coverage either 
in the original statute or through later-added retrocession provisions). 
 52. See COHEN, supra note 24, § 6.04[3][a], at 544-45.  Ten states acted at some 
point to assume jurisdiction over Indian country, although in many cases such 
jurisdiction was limited (e.g., to criminal cases only, or to certain reservations only)  
and/or later found to be invalid.  States that currently assert some degree of 
jurisdiction under P.L. 280 include Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and 
Washington.  See id. at 544 n.308. 
 53. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 61 (acknowledging that the policy of termination 
had   “almost uniformly disastrous” consequences). 
 54. Id. at 29-31 (referring, specifically, to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
 55. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (indicating that the approach of 
the political branches can be compared to that of the Supreme Court, which has 
vacillated over time between strong concern for tribal rights on the one hand, and 
fears about abuses of tribal power on the other).  The Court and the political 
branches, however, have not always embraced the same trends at the same time.  For 
example, the Court decided Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), which strongly 
embraces tribal autonomy, at a time when Congress was still flirting with 
assimilationism.  See infra. 
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reservations, and second, by increasing the role of states in Indian 
life.  Thus these two sets of policies, designed to achieve opposite 
ends, have resulted in an unintended hybrid:  reservations that often 
have strong tribal institutions, including courts, but that are 
geographically fragmented,56 and that share regulatory power, 
sometimes uneasily, with states.57 
Thus, as a result of various federal policies, tribes have some 
common characteristics of other sovereigns, including, for example, 
courts, political institutions, and sovereign immunity,58 while lacking 
others, such as political authority within their borders that operates 
irrespective of the ownership of individual parcels of land.  As the 
following Section argues, this particular set of characteristics has 
shaped the way in which the Supreme Court has developed what I will 
call, for lack of a better term, its jurisprudence of case allocation.59  In 
other words, the Court has at various times treated tribes like 
sovereigns; it has sought to protect tribal courts from state 
interference and, in particular, to prevent states from asserting 
jurisdiction over sensitive tribal issues.60  At the same time, the Court 
has also refused to assume that tribes have all the usual characteristics 
of sovereigns; it has, for example, held that tribal courts are not 
courts of general jurisdiction61 and that—in striking contrast to state 
courts—their jurisdiction is only as broad as the tribe’s underlying 
regulatory power.62 
                                                          
 56. There are numerous reasons why tribal identity may not be as strongly 
grounded in geography as other political entities.  Most obviously, tribes may have 
lost land they originally inhabited or that has political or cultural significance to the 
tribe through treaties or forced relocations.  See CANBY, supra note 31, at 18-19.  
Congressional policies of allotment and termination have also played a significant 
role.  Id. at 23, 58-59. 
 57. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 185-94 (discussing extent of state regulatory 
power in Indian country). 
 58. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) 
(reaffirming the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in a dispute over a promissory 
note executed by the tribe not signed on tribal land). 
 59. For purposes of this Article, the term “case allocation” is designed to 
encompass a few separate concepts:  the question of whether a case implicating 
Indian affairs should be brought in state or tribal court, the question of whether state 
or tribal law should apply to such a case, and the question of which decision-maker 
should determine the preceding two issues. 
 60. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959) (holding that non-Indians 
cannot sue Indians in state court for disputes centered on the reservation); Kiowa 
Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (reaffirming that 
tribes enjoy immunity from suit even for off-reservation activities). 
 61. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (holding that tribal courts 
cannot be courts of general jurisdiction because “a tribe’s inherent adjudicative 
jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction”). 
 62. See id. at 357-58 (declining to address whether a tribe’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction and its legislative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants are equal). 
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The distinct judicial goals of protecting tribal autonomy and 
limiting tribal authority often point in different directions.  The 
problem is compounded by the fact that reservations themselves are 
often fragmented, encompassing at least three different categories of 
land:  land owned by tribe members, land owned by non-Indians or 
Indians who are not members of the tribe, and tribal trust land.63  
Because these various types of land are subject to varying degrees of 
tribal influence and control, there is no obvious territorial marker of 
tribal authority.  Further, pockets of land outside Indian reservations, 
including “all dependent communities within the borders of the 
United States” and all allotted land with existing Indian title, also 
qualify as “Indian country” by federal statute.64  Therefore, though 
the geographical boundaries of the reservation may be clear, the 
geographical reach of the tribe’s power is far less so.65  Thus, a largely 
unintended byproduct of the aborted assimilationist program has 
been to increase the gray areas in which both states and tribes can 
plausibly claim jurisdiction. 
B.   Conflicting Rules:  The Supreme Court and Case Allocation 
In Indian jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court has had two faces:  
first as a protector of tribal autonomy, and second as an enforcer of 
limits on tribal power.  Yet, in both roles, the Court has used rules 
establishing which forum can or must hear a case as its primary 
means of implementing policy.  As the following Section argues, this 
practice has often led to illogical results. 
1.  Williams and Wold:  tribal autonomy as procedural rule 
In the 1958 case of Williams v. Lee,66 the Court established a 
jurisdictional principle that ensured that Indian defendants would 
not be required to defend themselves against non-Indians in possibly 
hostile state courts.  Reversing the Arizona state courts, the Supreme 
Court held that a non-Indian proprietor of a general store on the 
Navajo Indian Reservation who wished to sue a Navajo couple for 
unpaid debts was obliged to do so in tribal court.67  The Court 
                                                          
 63. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 126-27 (describing the various types of reservation 
land). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). 
 65. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); infra 
note 167 (addressing the limitations on tribal influence and control). 
 66. 358 U.S. 217 (1958). 
 67. See id. at 223 (“[T]o allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would 
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence 
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”). 
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established a famous test for determining whether a given state 
assertion of jurisdiction over Indian country was legitimate:  “whether 
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them.”68 
Williams had a powerful philosophical influence on lower courts.69  
The Court’s succinct definition of tribal sovereignty as “the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them” is 
perhaps the most widely quoted phrase in the Indian-law canon.70  
Beyond Williams’ strong defense of tribal autonomy, however, the 
case can also be interpreted as setting forth two subsidiary principles. 
First, although Williams’ holding was framed in terms of broad 
principles of tribal sovereignty, Williams’ most immediate effect was to 
establish a fairly rigid procedural rule:  if a non-Indian sues an Indian 
in a case arising in Indian country, that case must be heard in tribal 
court.71  While, as the Court recognized, such a rule provides a great 
deal of protection to tribes and tribal defendants, it also presents 
certain practical difficulties.  First, the rule assumes that the identities 
of plaintiff and defendant remain stable in any given case.  Often, 
however, this will not be so.  In certain cases—such as a complex 
contract dispute—it may not initially be clear who is liable to whom, 
and both parties may believe themselves to be aggrieved.  In such 
cases, which party becomes the plaintiff and which the defendant 
may be determined simply by who files suit first.  Similarly, someone 
who is sued and then brings a counterclaim may be both plaintiff and 
defendant in the same action.72  Moreover, the rule of Williams 
assumes that a tribal court will always be available to hear a dispute.  
This is not always the case, not only because some tribes are too small 
or poor to maintain judicial systems,73 but because a tribal court is 
under no obligation to exercise the full extent of its jurisdiction; 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 219-20. 
 69. See, e.g., Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67 (N.M. 2003) (applying 
the infringement test developed in Williams). 
 70. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 595 (describing this portion of the Williams 
opinion as “one of the most frequently cited passages in federal Indian law”). 
 71. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 546-47 (“Perhaps because of the ambiguous 
analytical basis of the holdings, state courts have seized upon the specific facts of 
[Williams] rather than struggle to apply vague notions about the infringement of 
tribal sovereignty or federal preemption to determine the limits of state court 
adjudicatory power.”). 
 72. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g 
(“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986) (recognizing the problem created by 
counterclaim asserted against Indian who had sued non-Indian in North Dakota 
court). 
 73. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 67 (noting that while some tribes have well-
developed judicial systems, others still rely on “very informal single-judge courts 
operated on a part-time basis without supplementary services”). 
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many tribes, for example, limit access to their courts to tribe 
members.74 
A more substantive effect of Williams, however, may have been to 
foster the perception that, in order for tribes to enjoy the right to “be 
ruled by” their own laws, such laws must be enforced in tribal court.  
Of course, on the facts of Williams itself, few would disagree that 
application of Arizona law to the tribal defendants—presumably what 
would have occurred had the plaintiffs been allowed to proceed in 
state court—would have undermined Navajo self-rule by substituting 
another sovereign’s laws as the decisional law in the case.  The Court, 
however, went further, suggesting that the mere “exercise of state 
jurisdiction” would “undermine the authority of the tribal courts over 
Reservation affairs.”75  Williams therefore firmly established the idea 
that tribal adjudication, not application of tribal law, was the primary 
device by which tribal sovereignty could be furthered. 
More subtly, Williams may have had the effect of encouraging state 
courts to think of tribal autonomy only in terms of tribal 
adjudication.  In other words, once a state court has satisfied itself 
that an assertion of jurisdiction over a given case would comport with 
Williams’ requirements—either because the defendant is non-Indian 
or because substantial parts of the transaction occurred off the 
reservation—it may conclude that it has done all that is necessary to 
respect tribes’ rights to  “make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.”76 
Williams remains a landmark case for tribal autonomy and an 
important guarantee of tribal rights.  Yet while the principles 
underlying Williams remain vital, the specific jurisdictional rule the 
Court chose to implement those principles is perhaps in some ways 
outdated, and its rigidity may constrain state courts in ways that are 
not always beneficial to tribes.77  
                                                          
 74. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 577 (noting that many tribes follow a model 
ordinance originally provided by the Department of the Interior, which does not 
grant jurisdiction over nonmembers). 
 75. 358 U.S. at 223. 
 76. Id. at 220.  As Reynolds notes, state courts often give Williams its narrowest 
possible scope: 
[S]tate courts typically refiuse to adjudicate disputes involving Indians or 
reservation affairs only if the defendant is an Indian and if the transaction 
involves no substantial off-reservation contacts. That is, state courts generally 
assert jurisdiction over suits brought against a non-Indian defendant even if 
the transaction arose in Indian country; similarly, many cases hold that state 
court adjudication is proper in lawsuits filed against an Indian defendant if 
the facts reveal substantial off-reservation contacts. 
Reynolds, supra note 7, at 547. 
 77. In Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976), a case involving a tribe 
member’s efforts to adopt a child who was also the subject of a tribal custody dispute, 
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Where Williams addressed the consequences of a suit by a non-
Indian against an Indian, Wold I 78 and Wold II 79 concerned the 
opposite situation:  the degree to which state courts were obliged to 
provide access to Indian plaintiffs suing non-Indian defendants.80  
Wold involved a North Dakota statute, Chapter 27-19, which provided 
that “jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended over 
all civil claims for relief which arise on an Indian reservation upon 
acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter.”81  
Chapter 27-19 further provided that, upon such acceptance, “civil 
laws of this state that are of general application to private property” 
would also apply in Indian country.82  Following the passage of 
Chapter 27-19, the Three Affiliated Tribes sued Wold Engineering in 
state court for negligence and breach of contract in connection with 
Wold’s construction of a water supply system on the reservation.83  
Wold counterclaimed for the Three Tribes’ alleged failure to make 
payments.  The North Dakota courts dismissed the claim for lack of 
jurisdiction, holding that when Chapter 27-19 instituted a tribal 
consent requirement, it disclaimed all jurisdiction over tribal 
actions.84 
                                                          
the Court reinforced and extended the central principle of Williams by suggesting 
that state courts lack jurisdiction against all Indian defendants, even in situations 
where the plaintiff is also Indian.  While the result in Fisher was an important victory 
for tribal autonomy over custody matters, the Court included some potentially 
troublesome language suggesting more generally that the need to allow tribal courts 
to decide tribal disputes should override the preferences of individual Indians.  
Responding to the argument that a bar on state-court access would be unfair to 
Indian plaintiffs, the Fisher Court found that “even if a jurisdictional holding 
occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has 
access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to 
benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the congressional policy of 
Indian self-government.”  Id. at 390-91.  The Court’s reasoning is particularly 
surprising given the existence of a seemingly far more plausible (and less 
paternalistic) justification for the result in Fisher—that concern for the rights of 
tribal defendants required that the claims asserted against them be decided in tribal 
forums and/or according to tribal law. 
78.  Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering 
(“Wold I”), 467 U.S. 138 (1984). 
79.  Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering 
(“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877 (1986). 
80.  See Wold I, 467 U.S. at 140 (noting that the case was “somewhat unusual in a 
central respect” because “the Tribe seeks, rather than contests, state-court 
jurisdiction, and the non-Indian party is in opposition”).  Although it is actually 
unclear how far Wold I and Wold II’s holdings extend, they have generally been 
interpreted by state courts to mandate access for Indians who wish to sue non-
Indians in state courts.  See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 553. 
81.  Wold II at 476 U.S. at 880 (quoting N.D. Cent. Code § 27-19-01 (Supp. 1985)).   
82.  Id.  
83.  Id. at 881. 
84.  Id. North Dakota courts had historically asserted jurisdiction over Indian 
country in cases not involving Indian land interests.  After P.L. 280 was passed, North 
Dakota courts interpreted the law as confirming jurisdiction they already possessed.  
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The Supreme Court reversed this holding, in a decision that has 
been taken to hold that that state courts must remain open for 
Indians who wish to bring suit there.85  The Court found that Chapter 
27-19 was preempted insofar as it attempted to “disclaim pre-existing 
jurisdiction over suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for which 
there is no other forum” if tribes did not consent to the state’s 
conditions.86  In so holding, the court relied on the “important 
backdrop” provided by “considerations of tribal sovereignty, and the 
federal interests in promoting Indian self-governance and 
autonomy,”87 finding that “the state interest, as presently 
implemented, is unduly burdensome on the federal and tribal 
interests.”88 
The Court drew a sharp contrast between this situation and that of 
Williams, finding that “tribal self-government is not impeded when a 
State allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal terms with other 
persons to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising 
in Indian country.89  Indeed, as the Court pointed out, Indians would 
often have no judicial recourse in the absence of such state 
jurisdiction, since even if plaintiffs were able to secure tribal 
judgments they would be unable to enforce them in state court.90 
Thus, instead of emphasizing the importance of a tribal forum, the 
Court instead focused on the displacement of tribal law.  The Court 
expressed skepticism about Chapter 27-19’s requirement that, in 
order to gain access to state courts, tribes would have to agree that 
state law would generally apply to claims by Indian plaintiffs.  This 
possibility, the Court found, was a “potentially severe intrusion on the 
Indians’ ability to govern themselves according to their own laws”91 
that “simply [could not] be reconciled with Congress’ jealous regard 
for Indian self-governance.”92 
                                                          
In 1963, in accordance with amendments to P.L. 280 permitting new assumptions of 
jurisdiction with tribal consent, the North Dakota legislature enacted Chapter 27-19. 
85.  See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 553 (noting that, while the result in Wold rested 
on narrow preemption grounds, state courts have interpreted the decision broadly). 
 86. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 883. 
 87. Id. at 884. 
 88. Id. at 888. 
 89. Wold I, 467 U.S. at 148-49; see Wold II, 476 U.S. at 888 (reasoning that allowing 
Indians to bring claims against non-Indians in state court does not diminish tribal 
sovereignty). 
 90. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 892.  Although Chapter 27-19 granted access to tribes that 
fulfilled the state’s conditions, the Court found these conditions to be “an 
unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty” that would “operate to effectively bar 
the Tribe from the courts.”  Id. at 889. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 890. 
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Wold I and II thus cast doubt on Williams’ implicit equation of 
tribal-court jurisdiction with tribal independence. Instead, the Wold 
cases suggest that adequate respect for tribal sovereignty hinges not 
on whether a case is heard in a state or tribal forum, but whether it is 
decided according to state or tribal law.93  Indeed, through its 
rejection of the state-law-mandating condition North Dakota 
attempted to impose, Wold II can even be read to imply that under 
some circumstances, state courts might be required to choose tribal 
law. 
At the same time, however, the Wold cases fail to explore the 
implications of some of these more sweeping statements, neglecting 
to consider the relationship between the regime they establish and 
the policy in favor of tribal adjudication that Williams reflects.  
Moreover, as is also arguably the case with Williams, the ringing 
endorsements of tribal autonomy found in Wold I and II can 
essentially be boiled down to a procedural rule:  in this case, that 
Indian plaintiffs must be allowed to sue non-Indian defendants in 
state court. 
Thus, under the everything-not-compulsory-is-forbidden regime 
that Williams and Wold I and II set up, state courts may not assert 
jurisdiction in situations where the defendant is an Indian and the 
plaintiff non-Indian; in the reverse situation, however, they may not 
decline jurisdiction.  As discussed earlier, this rule places a strong 
emphasis on the form of a lawsuit, creating a conundrum for courts—
and for litigants—in cases in which both parties have asserted claims 
against the other.94  The Wold II Court recognized this issue but set it 
aside, declining to address the problem of how counterclaims should 
be handled.95 
The Court’s silence is particularly striking given that application of 
tribal law under choice-of-law principles would represent one way to 
reconcile Williams with Wold I and II.  In both Williams and the Wold 
cases, a principal threat to tribal sovereignty was that a tribe, or one 
of its members, would be confronted with the possibility of having 
state law applied to tribal disputes—in Williams because the state 
court would likely have applied Arizona law to an on-reservation 
transaction, in Wold I and II because North Dakota attempted to 
                                                          
 93. Id. 
 94. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (highlighting the complexity of 
tribal jurisdiction when elements such as the counterclaim and cross-claim are 
introduced into litigation). 
 95. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 891 n.* (“The extent to which respondent’s counterclaim 
may be used not only to defeat or reduce petitioner’s recovery, but also to fix the 
Tribe’s affirmative liability has been the subject of some discussion in this case.”). 
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condition tribal access to state courts on the promise to accept the 
application of state law.  By focusing exclusively on the court in which 
a dispute was to be heard rather than the law to be applied, however, 
the Court obscured these differences. 
2.  The Montana principle:  tribes’ limited power over nonmembers 
Even as it has affirmed tribal sovereignty in many cases, the Court 
has also pursued a distinct, and sometimes opposite goal—shielding 
tribal nonmembers from unfamiliar tribal courts.  In the past two 
decades, the Court has substantially narrowed tribes’ ability to 
regulate the conduct of nonmembers and impeded the ability of 
tribal courts to decide cases involving nonmembers.  Under current 
law, a person over whom the tribe lacks regulatory jurisdiction—a 
category that includes almost all nonmembers—cannot be haled into 
tribal court.96 
This principle, an unusual approach to adjudicative jurisdiction,97 
has brought into existence another complex jurisdictional inquiry in 
cases involving tribal interests.  In contrast to the several independent 
rules that govern whether state courts may (or must) hear suits 
involving tribal contacts, the existence of tribal-court jurisdiction 
hinges on a test initially set forth in a single case, Montana v. United 
                                                          
 96. The Court has not applied this reasoning to state courts and state law; that is, 
while the Court sometimes has assumed that state jurisdiction over reservation 
matters has the inherent potential to undermine tribal sovereignty, the Court has 
never suggested that the jurisdictional reach of state courts over tribe members is 
equivalent to the legislative authority states can exert on the reservation.  In fact, in 
Bryan v. Itasca County, the Court held precisely the opposite:  that a grant of 
adjudicative jurisdiction to state courts did not in itself imply the authority to 
regulate on-reservation conduct.  See 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) (“[I]f Congress in 
enacting Pub. L. 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory 
powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have expressly said 
so.”). 
 97. Consider, for example, the tenuous connection that may justify haling an out-
of-state defendant into another state’s courts under the Supreme Court’s personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence.  See, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 
(1957) (holding that Texas corporation’s assumption of insurance policy of a 
California resident was sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction in California); 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1211 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding California court had personal jurisdiction over French 
nonprofit that had sent a cease-and-desist letter ordering Web service to take certain 
actions in California).  In such situations, the state lacks regulatory jurisdiction in the 
ordinary sense of the term, but clearly possesses adjudicative jurisdiction.  Joseph 
William Singer takes an interesting view of the problem in Publicity Rights and the 
Conflict of Laws:  Tribal Court Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1996), noting that “the question of whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a 
case blurs four issues that are ordinarily separated in jurisdictional analysis of non-
Indian courts”—that is, personal jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, choice-of-law 
analysis, and subject matter jurisdiction. 
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States.98 In a holding that remains controversial, Montana set forth the 
basic test for determining whether a tribe has regulatory jurisdiction 
over a given matter, finding that tribes lacked such power where it 
was not “necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.”99  These limits on tribal powers were subject to just 
two explicit exceptions.  Tribes might permissibly regulate “the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, 
or other arrangements,” and retained the power to “exercise civil 
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its 
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare 
of the tribe.”100  Further, the Court suggested, the Tribe might 
legitimately exercise power to regulate the activities of non-Indians 
on tribal trust land or Indian-owned land.101   
For a long time, it remained an open question whether Montana 
applied to the tribal adjudicative as well as the regulatory context.  In 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors,102 the Court finally extended the Montana 
principle to tribal jurisdiction, holding that “[a]s to 
nonmembers, . . . a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed 
its legislative jurisdiction.”  Strate involved a collision between two 
vehicles, one driven by the widow of a Three Affiliated Tribes 
member and one driven by a non-Indian contractor doing on-
reservation landscaping work for a tribal community building.103  The 
accident occurred on a state highway within the geographical 
boundaries of the reservation.104  The injured woman, who was not 
herself a tribe member, sued the non-Indian contractor in tribal 
court.105  The Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over 
the case.  While again emphasizing that “tribes retain considerable 
control over nonmember conduct on tribal land,” the Court 
nonetheless found that, in this case “[t]he right-of-way North Dakota 
acquired for the State's highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch 
equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-
                                                          
 98. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 99. Id. at 564. 
100. Id. at 565-66. 
101. The Court observed, seemingly with approval, that the district court had held 
that “Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme d[id] not prevent the Crow Tribe 
from limiting or forbidding non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands still owned by 
or held in trust for the Tribe or its members.”  See id. at 566-67.    
102. 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997). 
103. Id. at 442-43. 
104. Id. at 443. 
105. Id.  
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Indian land.”106  The Court thus rested its decision on Montana’s 
“general rule” that, apart from exceptions for consensual 
relationships and actions directly affecting the tribe’s political 
integrity, “tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers 
on non-Indian land within a reservation.”107  
Even as it clarified the law to some extent, Strate also signaled that 
multiple factors would have to be taken into account in determining 
whether tribal court jurisdiction existed.  The facts of Strate, on their 
face, pointed in more than one direction.  The accident had 
occurred on tribal trust land within the reservation; on the other 
hand, the state had a right-of-way over the land.108  By virtue of his 
work on the reservation, the contractor-defendant had voluntarily 
entered into at least a minimal relationship with the tribe; 
nonetheless, the connection was not extensive enough to trigger 
Montana’s exception for consensual relationships.109  The injured 
woman was not herself a tribe member, though her husband and 
children were members.110  While the Court did not indicate that any 
of these facts was individually dispositive, the tribe would almost 
certainly have had a far stronger case for jurisdiction had all facts 
pointed more definitively toward the tribe.  
In Strate, the Court thus established a balance between a tribe’s 
legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction that is, in many ways, the 
opposite the balance that exists with respect to states.  In contrast to 
tribal courts under the regime that Strate established, state courts 
have far more extensive jurisdiction to hear disputes involving Indian 
litigants than state legislatures do to regulate the conduct of tribe 
members.111  More generally, the jurisdiction of state courts is broader 
than, and distinct from, the realm in which state legislatures can 
permissibly regulate; to take the most obvious example, an out-of-
                                                          
106. Id. at 454. 
107. Id. at 446. 
108. Id. at 442-43. 
109. While suggesting that the Montana “consensual relationship” exception 
applied primarily to contract disputes, the Court in fact cited at least factors in 
determining that the case at issue did not fall within the exception.  First, the case 
involved “tortious conduct” and therefore did not arise out of a contract.  Id. at 457.  
Second, the dispute was “distinctly non tribal in nature,” as it arose between two non-
Indians involved in a “run of the mill highway accident” (brackets and quotation 
marks omitted).  Id.  Finally, the injured woman was not a party to the subcontract 
between A-1 and the tribe.  Id.  It is also notable that the record was unclear about 
whether the contractor had been on the job at the time of the accident; the court did 
not appear to regard this factor as significant.  Id. 
110. Id. at 443.  There was a dispute as to whether Fredericks resided on the 
reservation, but the Court held that her residence was “immaterial.”  Id. at 443 n.2. 
111. Indeed, as previously discussed, the holding of Bryan depends on this 
distinction.   
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state defendant may be haled into court under a long-arm statute to 
answer for conduct that the state legislature could not regulate 
directly.112  In finding tribal jurisdiction to be no greater—and 
possibly less extensive—than tribal regulatory power, the Court 
signaled a sharply constrained view of the role of tribal courts relative 
to state courts.  Further, by indicating that the existence of tribal 
jurisdiction would always be a multifactor, fact-based analysis, the 
Court ensured that, in the large majority of cases, a litigant wishing to 
bring a case in tribal court would have to subject herself to 
considerable uncertainty.113 
Therefore, the effect of Strate has been not only to restrict tribal 
courts’ jurisdiction over many claims that concern tribal matters, but 
to ensure that a litigant will often have to endure lengthy uncertainty 
before receiving a tribal court judgment that is free of jurisdictional 
challenge.114  By contrast, Indians always have the option of bringing 
                                                          
112. See supra note 94. 
113. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).  In Nevada v. Hicks, the Court purported to clarify 
Strate’s holding, but may have only succeeded in further complicating the issue.  
Hicks, a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes living on the reservation, 
sued state and tribal officers in tribal court, claiming that in the course of searching 
his house, they had damaged his property and exceeded the bounds of their warrant.  
(The authorities were looking for evidence that Hicks had illegally killed a California 
bighorn sheep.)  As an ironic result of the extensive cooperation that had occurred 
between state and tribal authorities, the case presented complex issues of 
overlapping state and tribal power.  The state court had conditioned its search 
warrant for Hicks’s property on the agreement of tribal authorities, and the state 
game warden and a tribal officer ultimately conducted the search jointly. Hicks’s suit 
alleged claims for trespass to land and chattels and abuse of process; he also claimed 
several violations of his federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Phrasing the central 
question narrowly, the Court found that the tribe lacked adjudicative jurisdiction 
over “state officers enforcing state law.”  More troublingly, however, the Court also 
found that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the several federal claims Hicks 
asserted under § 1983.  The Court based this holding on “the restrictions inherent in 
tribal court jurisdiction,” which “made it impossible that they be courts of general 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 367.  Hicks also complicated law of tribal jurisdiction in another 
way—by casting doubt upon the factors that the Court in Strate had suggested would 
be central to a determination of tribal jurisdiction.  Strate had indicated that a 
significant consideration in establishing the existence of tribal jurisdiction was 
whether the land on which relevant events had occurred was tribal-owned trust land 
or private fee land.  520 U.S. at 454 (stating that “tribes retain considerable control 
over nonmember conduct on tribal land”).  The Hicks Court, by contrast, found that 
“[t]he ownership status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in determining 
whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.’” 533 U.S. at 359 (quoting Montana, 450 
U.S. at 564-65). 
 114. This is true not only because the principles that determine whether a tribal 
court has jurisdiction are difficult to apply, but because the extent of tribal court 
jurisdiction is a federal issue, and defendants are required to exhaust jurisdictional 
challenges in tribal court before a federal court will hear their claims.  Thus, a 
plaintiff who sues in tribal court may face jurisdictional challenges at all levels of the 
tribal judicial system; even if jurisdiction is upheld, the defendant can continue to 
pursue jurisdictional challenges in federal court.  The ultimate result, if a federal 
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cases against nonmembers in state court; indeed, under Wold I and II, 
state courts are required to hear such cases.115  Thus, the Court’s 
decisions may be said to have limited tribal-court jurisdiction in two 
ways:  first, by establishing a class of claims that tribal courts are 
prohibited from hearing; second, by creating another class of claims 
in which a case can be made for tribal-court jurisdiction, but where 
considerations of efficiency, convenience, and jurisdictional certainty 
are likely to make state court the more appealing choice. 
As a result of Strate, therefore, the tribe may effectively lose all say 
in the outcome of many cases that have a clear relationship to tribe 
members and tribal lands.  The Court, however, has never explicitly 
considered the tribal-sovereignty issues that are entailed in shunting 
this class of cases into state rather than tribal court.  Indeed, the 
Court has essentially suggested that, for a tribal plaintiff, any remedy 
is a good remedy—in other words, as long as the plaintiff can recover 
in state court, the unavailability of a tribal forum is no great 
injustice.116  Setting aside the issue of whether this is true in individual 
cases—and it may not be, either because tribal law is more favorable 
to plaintiffs than state law or because bringing the claim in state court 
entails severe inconvenience117—the Court’s approach is problematic 
because it gives no weight to the tribe’s institutional interests in 
having cases in which the tribe has a legitimate interest decided 
according to tribal law.   
The forum-based approach the Supreme Court has followed is thus 
both cumbersome from a standpoint of judicial economy and 
inadequate to serve many legitimate tribal sovereign interests. The 
next section considers how the state-tribal case allocation problem 
might be re-imagined, at least in part, as a choice-of-law question, and 
how such an approach might better serve the needs of states, tribes, 
and litigants. 
                                                          
court finds that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, is that the plaintiff may have to 
restart the lawsuit from the beginning in state court. 
 115. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
expansive view of state court jurisdiction for many Indian claims). 
 116. In Strate, for example, the Court recognized that “those who drive carelessly 
on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and 
surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members.”  520 U.S. at 457-58.  Nonetheless, the 
Court appeared to believe that, in light of the availability of a state forum, a tribal 
remedy was unnecessary.  Id. at 459. 
 117. State court may be most obviously inconvenient simply for its physical 
distance from the reservation—a burden that would not be eliminated even if the 
state court were permitted to apply tribal law.  Suing in state court may, however, 
impose other burdens on the plaintiff—the burden of familiarizing oneself with state 
law, for example—that would be reduced if the plaintiff had the option of suing on 
tribal-law claims in state court. 
FLOREY 9/12/2006  3:46:27 PM 
1650 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1627 
II. APPLYING CHOICE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES IN THE TRIBAL CONTEXT 
As the preceding section has sought to establish, the forum-
selection rules the Supreme Court has established have generally (if 
not exclusively) operated against a background assumption that both 
state and tribal courts will apply forum law.  In addition, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that tribal courts may only exercise jurisdiction 
in cases to which the tribe could apply tribal law in any case, and that 
Congress does not generally intend for tribal courts to hear federal 
causes of action.118  No such barrier exists, of course, to tribal-court 
application of state law, and some tribes do, in fact, apply state law—
for example, to fill in gaps in tribal codes.119  But no general principle 
of federal Indian law obliges tribes to do so.  Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court has increasingly restricted tribal-court jurisdiction to 
matters concerning the internal relations of tribes, most cases 
brought in tribal court are likely to involve tribe members and 
concern matters occurring solely within the boundaries of the 
reservation.  Thus, it is normally a fair expectation that when a case is 
brought in tribal court, tribal law should and will apply. 
The purpose of this Section is to argue that the parallel proposition 
need not prevail in state court—when matters involving Indians 
appear in state court, state courts should not automatically apply state 
law.120  Instead, states should treat tribes in the same manner as they 
do sister states or foreign nations, consulting their usual choice-of-law 
principles to determine whether tribal law should be applied. 
In one sense, this is not a surprising recommendation.  More than 
one commentator has observed that state choice-of-law principles, 
considered in the abstract, would frequently dictate the application of 
tribal law to state-court cases.121  Some state courts have, in fact, 
experimented with applying tribal law.122  Other state courts, however, 
                                                          
 118. See supra note 113 (noting the Supreme Court’s determination in Hicks that 
Congress’s intent has been to limit tribal jurisdiction over federal claims to those 
areas expressly provided for by Congress). 
 119. Pearson, supra note 5, at 718. 
 120. See Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated 
Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation 
Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979, 981 (1995), for a general argument that state and 
tribal courts need not always have symmetrical obligations toward each other. 
 121. The leading Indian-law treatise, for example, concludes that “[a]pplication of 
modern choice-of-law principles should sometimes lead state and federal courts to 
apply tribal law in disputes arising in Indian country.”  COHEN, supra note 24, 
§ 7.06[2], at 652-54.  See also CANBY, supra note 31, at 229-30; Pearson, supra note 5, at 
716-19 (exploring the possibility of applying various choice-of-law theories to cases 
with tribal contacts). 
 122. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 5, at 717 n.125 (citing examples of state-court 
willingness to apply tribal law). 
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have hesitated to do so for a variety of reasons.  State courts have 
expressed concerns that the application of tribal law by a non-Indian 
court constitutes an infringement on tribal sovereignty;123 they have 
also worried that the process of establishing the content of tribal law 
on a given subject is simply too difficult.124  Far more frequently, 
however, state courts have, with little explanation, neglected to 
engage in choice-of-law analysis at all, simply assuming that state law 
will apply to cases involving tribes that are brought in state court.125 
Under current choice-of-law principles, this assumption is not 
viable.  Although the atypical nature of tribal sovereignty may require 
some adjustments, state courts following commonly accepted choice-
of-law principles should apply tribal law to many of the cases 
involving tribal matters over which they have jurisdiction.  Further, 
such a practice would have distinct advantages, promoting tribal 
interests while facilitating greater efficiency and judicial economy in 
cases that cross reservation borders. 
A.  Modern Choice-of-Law Theories 
States today subscribe to a broad diversity of choice-of-law theories, 
some of which are centuries old and others of which academics have 
developed only recently.  Prior to the mid-twentieth century, most 
states followed a similar set of relatively bright-line choice-of-law 
principles.  These principles tended to be grounded in geography 
and territory, resting on the premise that a given cause of action 
should be governed by the law of the place where relevant events 
occurred.126  Under the traditional approach, for example, the validity 
of a contract was governed by the law of the place of contracting, 
while breach of contract was governed by the law of the place of 
performance. 127  Under the principle of lex loci delicti—the law of the 
place of the wrong—torts were governed by the law of the state where 
the injury had occurred.128  Matters that were purely procedural were 
                                                          
123. See infra note 305 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of Laplante 
on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and considering whether application of tribal 
law in state courts infringes upon tribal sovereignty). 
124. See, e.g., Warm Springs Prods. Inds. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 
740 (Or. 1986). 
125. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 558. 
126. See David P. Currie et al., Conflicts of Laws 6th ed. 13 (1993) (“Regardless of 
their heated arguments over the theories of comity, vested rights, and local law, 
adherents of the traditional learning essentially agreed on the territorial principle: 
The governing substantive rule was derived from the law of the place where relevant 
events had occurred.”). 
127. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 332, 358 (1934). 
128. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) (“The place of wrong is in 
the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort 
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nearly always governed by the law of the forum.129  These clear, 
precise principles—which had the advantage of being easy to apply 
and the disadvantage of being rigid—were described at length in the 
Restatement (First) of  Conflict of Laws, which appeared in 1934.130  
Toward the middle of the 20th century, a number of prominent 
choice-of-law scholars launched a revolt against the First Restatement.  
Brainerd Currie, perhaps the most famous of the academic 
reformers, blasted the First Restatement’s methodology as “loaded 
with escape devices,” including the device of “novel or disingenuous 
characterization” described above, the device of “manipulating the 
connecting factor” (i.e., emphasizing or de-emphasizing the 
importance of a particular contact), and the device of declaring a 
foreign state’s law to be against “local public policy” as a basis for not 
applying the relevant law.131 
Ultimately, these criticisms helped to launch what has become 
known as the “conflicts revolution,”132 a series of competing proposals 
for choice-of-law principles to replace the First Restatement 
approach.  Among the more influential proposals put forth was the 
method of resolving conflicts known as “interest analysis,” developed 
and advanced by Brainerd Currie.133  Under Currie’s proposal, when a 
party urged the application of a law other than forum law, a court was 
to look to the “governmental policy expressed in [forum] law” and 
determine whether the forum had an interest in having its law 
applied.134  If the forum lacked any such interest and the foreign state 
had an interest, foreign law would apply; in all other cases, forum law 
would apply.135  Courts would determine what constituted an 
“interest” by considering whether application of the law would 
directly advance the law’s underlying policy.136 
                                                          
takes place.”).  Thee accompanying notes clarified that, in personal injury cases, this 
was “the place where the harmful force takes effect on the body.”  Id. § 377.  This 
approach thus generally looked to the place of injury, not to the place where 
negligent conduct might have occurred.  The Restatement allowed for a few 
exceptions, however; the standard of care, for example, was determined by the “place 
of the actor’s conduct.”  Id. § 380(2). 
129. Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934). 
130. Id. 
    131. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 
DUKE L.J. 171, 175 (1993). 
     132. GENE R. SHREVE, A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ANTHOLOGY 57 (1997). 
 133. Currie, supra note 131, at 171-75. 
 134. Id. at 178. 
 135. Id.; see Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws:  A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 98-103 (1984) (concluding that Currie’s “governmental interest 
analysis amounts to little more than a complicated pretext for applying the lex fori in 
all but the rarest circumstances”). 
 136. See id. at 101-02 (reviewing broadly how Currie’s “interest analysis” 
determines what law to apply by considering whether the policy underlying forum 
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Other academics pointed out flaws in Currie’s approach—in 
particular, its strong bias in favor of forum law, which they believed 
he had failed to justify adequately137—and offered their own diverse 
proposals.138  Some were variations on interest analysis; William 
Baxter, for example, argued that courts should resolve true conflicts 
between state laws by “determin[ing] which state’s internal objective 
will be least impaired by subordination [to another state’s interest] in 
cases like the one before it.”139  Others advocated wholly different 
methods of resolving conflicts.  Robert A. Leflar, for example, 
advocated that courts choose the law that was “better,” in the sense of 
“mak[ing] good socio-economic sense for the time in which the court 
speaks”140—a view opposite to that of Currie, who believed that courts 
should not be in the business of making policy-based choices between 
the laws of different states.141  Courts as well as academics worked out 
alternatives to the traditional principles.  In 1963, New York broke 
forcefully with tradition by announcing that it would make choice-of-
law determinations based on the relative number of contacts the 
litigants had with each competing jurisdiction and the degree of 
interest each jurisdiction had in seeing its law applied to the case142—
a method the court described as the “center of gravity” approach.143  
Other states, including California144 and Pennsylvania,145 developed 
their own methods as well. 
                                                          
law would be advanced by its application). 
 137. See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 135; Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and 
Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987). 
 138. For a helpful overview and critique of various modern choice-of-law 
methodologies, see generally Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 
B.U. L. Rev. 731 (1990). 
 139. William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 
(1963). 
 140. See R.A. Leflar, Conflicts Law:  More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. 
L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966).  Leflar advocated consideration of several factors, 
including predictability, maintenance of interstate order, simplification of the 
judicial task, and advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, in addition to 
the question of which law was “better,” although he did acknowledge that the latter 
factor was a “potent” one.  Id. 
 141. Currie, supra note 131, at 176-77 (observing that weighing competing state 
interests was a “political function” and not one that should be “committed to courts 
in a democracy”). 
 142. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. 1963). 
 143. Id. at 282. 
 144. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320 (Cal. 1976) (applying a 
version of Baxter’s “comparative impairment” analysis—i.e., the principle that “true 
conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the state whose interest would be 
more impaired if its law were not applied”). 
 145. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 855-56 (Pa. 1970) (considering, after 
establishing that a true conflict exists, which state has the greater interest in the 
application of its law). 
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Because of the lack of consensus about the direction reform should 
take, the 1971 Second Restatement—to the disappointment of 
some146—failed to take a strong stand among the various 
methodologies, instead offering an array of choice-of-law factors from 
which courts could choose, with little guidance as to which factors 
should be most important.   
The Second Restatement’s general approach was to instruct courts 
to choose the law of the state with the “most significant relationship” 
to the cause of action.  That determination, however, was itself based 
on a variety of factors.  For example, where torts were concerned, 
courts were to look to the traditional place-of-injury criterion, but 
also to consider other factors:  the place of conduct causing the 
injury; the domicile, residence, and place of business of the parties; 
and the place where the parties’ relationship was “centered.”147  
Unhelpfully, the Restatement added that “[t]hese contacts are to be 
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the 
particular issue.”148 To further complicate matters, the Second 
Restatement was unclear about the degree to which it actually 
represented a break with tradition.  In several sections discussing 
specific tort problems, for example, the Second Restatement 
included the comment that “[t]he applicable law will usually be the 
local law of the state where the injury occurred”149—a statement that 
echoed the First Restatement.150 
Perhaps as a result of the fact that the Second Restatement did not 
settle clearly on any single method, states adopted diverse 
approaches.  Where tort law is concerned, for example, ten states 
currently follow traditional First Restatement principles, about twice 
that number follow the Second Restatement, and the remainder 
follow other modern approaches.151  The breakdown of approaches is 
similar in contracts, although some states that apply traditional 
principles to torts adopt modern doctrines for contracts and vice 
versa.152  There is considerable diversity even among the smaller 
subgroup of states that hear the majority of Indian-law cases.  New 
Mexico,153 for example, follows traditional principles; Arizona, 
                                                          
 146. See Shreve, supra note 165, at 189-90. 
 147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 156(2). 
 150. SHREVE, supra note 132, at 187-90. 
 151. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004:  
Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 944 (2004) (cataloging state-to-state 
differences in choice-of-law methodology). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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Montana, Oklahoma, Washington, South Dakota, and Utah154 
generally follow the Second Restatement; and California, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin follow other modern 
principles.155 
Nonetheless, despite the increased variety that prevails in the post-
Second Restatement era, the choice-of-law principles of many states 
continue to have elements in common.  For example, most states take 
into account, to a greater or lesser extent, some or all of the following 
factors:  the domicile, residence, and workplace of the parties; the 
place of relevant events; the interests of the various states whose law 
may be at issue; and the expectations of the parties.156  Further, 
choice-of-law theory has not escaped its traditional territoriality.157  
Sometimes the territorial element is obvious, in both traditional 
factors such as the place of injury and “modern” ones such as party 
domicile.  Other factors have a subtler territorial component.  Party 
expectations, for example, may be affected by the place where the 
majority of relevant events, or the most significant ones, occurred.158  
Moreover, it is hard to talk about state governmental interest without 
talking about geography, since states are generally considered to have 
little or no legitimate interest in regulating events that occur outside 
their borders and cause no effects inside them.159 
Whatever their other differences, choice-of-law theories tend to 
rely on a place-based notion of political power—the idea that states 
have legitimate interests in the events that occur within their borders 
and the people who reside there.  There is inevitable difficulty in 
translating these notions to the Indian-law context, where the scope 
of tribal regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction is not based merely 
on geography, but on a complex mix of geography, land ownership, 
tribal membership, and strength of tribal interests.160 
                                                          
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1306 
(1989) (“Clearly there is no way to formulate a choice of law regime other than to 
found it upon territorial assumptions of some sort.”). 
 158. Any regime based on party expectations is, of course, inevitably circular:  
people’s expectations will be shaped by what the law is.  But the expectation that, 
within territorial boundaries of a given sovereign, one is subject to that sovereign’s 
law is a deeply entrenched one that changes in choice-of-law practice are unlikely to 
dislodge easily. 
 159. Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1306. 
 160. See Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 437, 478 (1998) (“The extent to which tribal power is based on territorial 
dominion instead of consent, and the scope of tribal adjudicatory, regulatory, and 
taxation authority over nonmembers, are indeed perplexing questions, which in turn 
have produced inharmonious answers from the Supreme Court in recent years.”). 
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B.  Making Sense of Choice of Law in the Tribal Context 
The following Section considers how choice-of-law concepts might 
be applied in the tribal context.  This Section first considers the 
issues that arise—both in the abstract and in practice—when state 
courts attempt to apply territorial notions in a realm in which the 
reach of sovereign authority is more uncertain.  Second, it considers 
how a choice-of-law approach might be better suited than the current 
case-allocation regime to creating fair and efficient ways of resolving 
disputes that contain tribal contacts. 
1.  The initial problem of translation 
The territorial emphasis shared by most choice-of-law systems rests 
on the normally unproblematic assumption that a political entity has 
jurisdiction over events that occur within its borders, and further that 
such borders are familiar, predictable, and easy to discern.161  In the 
Indian-law context, such assumptions do not always hold.  The 
reservation’s boundaries may be clear, but the reservation is 
nonetheless a place where, the Supreme Court has told us, tribes and 
states share regulatory authority;162 conversely, under the statutory 
definition of “Indian country,”163 tribal authority may extend to 
pockets of Indian-owned land outside the reservation.  Further, 
according to the Montana line of cases, the degree of authority the 
tribe possesses over a particular parcel of land depends not only on 
whether it is within or outside Indian country, but also on a host of 
other factors:  whether or not the land is tribal trust land;164 if the 
land is privately owned, whether it is owned by a member or a 
nonmember of the tribe;165 whether the state has a right-of-way over 
the land;166 whether the land is especially significant to tribal life;167 
                                                          
 161. As one commentator observed, for example, “[a] rule of law may be 
construed either to apply to people, things and transactions within a state, or to 
apply to the state’s subjects, wherever they may happen to be.”  Juenger, supra note 
135, at 11. 
 162. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989)(“States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory.”). 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). 
 164. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), one of the 
rare cases in which the Court applied Montana’s “political integrity” exception, 
illustrates the fact-bound nature of tribal legislative jurisdiction.  The case concerned 
two parcels of land located on the Yakima Reservation:  a 160-acre tract owned by 
Philip Brendale, who was “part Indian but not a member of the Yakima Nation,” and 
who had inherited the parcel from family members; and a 40-acre tract “bordered on 
the north by trust land and on the other three sides by fee land,” owned by Stanley 
Wilkinson, a non-Indian and nonmember. Id. at 417-18.  Further complicating 
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and even whether the land is deep within the reservation or closer to 
its borders.168 
As a result, the answers to normally straightforward choice-of-law 
questions are more complicated when events occur in Indian 
country.  When an Indian is injured on a reservation by the negligent 
conduct of nonmember, for example, what is the “place” of the injury 
for choice-of-law purposes?  The most obvious answer, of course, is 
that the place is the reservation itself.  Yet this assumption is not free 
of difficulties.  A tribe does not have complete control over its own 
territory; in all likelihood, it could not hale the nonmember-
tortfeasor into its own courts, and it could not otherwise exercise 
sovereign power to fine or punish the nonmember for her 
behavior.169  While the reservation is clearly the “place” of the injury 
in the geographical sense, it is less obvious that it is the “place” in a 
choice-of-law sense. 
Other choice-of-law factors state courts consider may also be 
difficult to translate into the Indian-law context.  Some courts, for 
example, take into account the parties’ domicile in deciding which 
state’s law to apply.170  For purposes of determining jurisdiction in 
                                                          
matters, Brendale’s parcel was in a forested “closed area” of the reservation open 
only to Yakima Nation members and permittees; Wilkinson’s parcel was in an 
unrestricted “open area” of which nearly half was fee land.  Id. at 415-16.  In an 
opinion composed of fractured pluralities, the Court held that Brendale’s parcel fell 
within the “political integrity” exception to Montana and was thus subject to tribal 
zoning regulations; Wilkinson’s, however, did not.  Justice Stevens’s concurrence, 
which announced the Court’s judgment on Brendale’s parcel, found that the 
division of the reservation lands into a closed area consisting mostly of nonfee land 
and an open area with a large percentage of fee land was a fact of “critical 
importance” to the case.  Id. at 437.  Justice Stevens further relied on the character of 
the closed area’s use as an “undeveloped refuge of cultural and religious 
significance,” noting that the tribe had invoked its power to exclude nonmembers 
from the area and thus “preserved the power to define the essential character of that 
area.”  Id. at 441.  While acknowledging that his opinion was subject to the criticism 
that “it does not identify a bright-line rule,” Justice Stevens defended his approach 
on the grounds that “the factual predicate to these cases is itself complicated” such 
that it was impossible for the Court to “articulate precise rules.”  Id. at 447-48. 
 168. Id. at 441. 
 169. Cf. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1990) (rejecting tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on grounds that tribes are “limited sovereigns, 
necessarily subject to the overriding authority of the United States”). 
 170. Brilmayer has described domicile as having two components—“voice and 
exit.”  Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1307.  While the concept of “exit” should 
presumably mean the same thing in the Indian-law context as it does in relations 
between states—that is, people have the same choice whether to live on or leave the 
reservation as they do whether to leave or remain in a given state—the idea of “voice” 
is more complex, since tribes commonly grant voting rights only to members.  
Should “voice” be understood narrowly as having to do with political rights, and 
should only members of the tribe therefore be considered fully “domiciled” on the 
reservation?  Or should domicile encompass a broader notion of community and 
self-identification, so that nonmembers who live on the reservation, particularly if 
they have ties to the tribe or participate in tribal life, should be considered to have 
FLOREY 9/12/2006  3:46:27 PM 
1658 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1627 
Indian law, however, a party’s decision to live on or off the 
reservation has always been secondary to the facts of that person’s 
race (Indian or non-Indian) and political status (member or 
nonmember of the tribe).171  Should the same be true in choice-of-law 
determinations?  Questions of domicile—and of other choice-of-law 
factors—may also be intertwined with concepts of “place”; domicile, 
for example, depends on the place where a litigant resides.172  Thus, 
the uncertainties inherent in defining “place” in the tribal-law 
context are also relevant here. 
State courts mostly have dealt with these problems by ignoring 
them.  Only very rarely have state courts have considered whether 
their choice-of-law principles require them to apply tribal law; in the 
few occasions when state courts have addressed the issue, they have 
often quickly dismissed the possibility of applying tribal law.173 
Whatever problems may exist in applying choice-of-law principles 
to the tribal context, this clearly cannot always be the right result.  
That is, however restrictively one understands the meaning of core 
choice-of-law concepts such as “place” or “domicile,” cases 
unquestionably exist in which a consistent application of choice-of-
law principles should dictate the application of tribal law. 
To see how this is so, consider the traditional principle that the law 
of the place of the injury should control in tort cases.174  In this 
context, the phrase “the law of the place” might be said to mean one 
of two things.  One might choose to place the emphasis on “place”—
in other words, the entity within whose geographical borders an event 
occurs—and then apply the law of the sovereign with which that 
place is associated.  In other words, if an event occurs within the 
                                                          
made the reservation their domicile? 
 171. See, e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 443 n.2 (finding that question of whether plaintiff 
resided on the reservation was “immaterial”). 
   172.   See Brilmayer, supra note 157 (noting that choice-of-law categories inevitably 
have geographical dimensions). 
 173. See, e.g., Harrison v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 700 So. 2d 247, 249 (Miss. 1997) 
(stating, without elaboration, that state and tribal law on a given subject were 
identical and choice-of-law analysis hence unnecessary); Warm Springs Forest Prods. 
Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. 1986) (finding that 
Oregon law applied to contract entered into by a tribal corporation); Louis v. United 
States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 n.5 (D.N.M. 1999) (finding that, under federal 
statute, Congress likely intended state, rather than tribal, law to apply because of the 
“difficulty in proving the existence and substance of any tribal law on the subject of 
the tort”). Courts may also recast what is essentially a tribal-law issue as a 
jurisdictional issue.  See, e.g., Begay v. Roberts, 807 P.2d 1111, 1117 (Ariz. App. 1990) 
(holding that the lower court, while possessing jurisdiction over the underlying case, 
lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of garnishment against a Navajo defendant’s wages 
because Navajo law did not provide for such a remedy). 
   174. This analysis is also relevant to other choice-of-law factors that have a 
territorial component. 
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reservation, the reservation is the “place,” and the “law of the place” 
is therefore tribal law.  Second, one might, alternatively, place the 
emphasis on “law,” and view the phrase instead as referring to the 
sovereign possessing direct regulatory authority over events that 
occur in a particular place.  When an event occurs within a 
reservation, either the state or the tribe might have that authority, 
depending on the various relevant factors enumerated in the 
Montana line of cases.175  Thus, under the second view, if the conduct 
at issue occurs, say, on the private land of a nonmember, the “law of 
the place,” if understood to mean the law that actually applies176 in that 
place, under those circumstances, may be state law, even if the land is 
nominally located within the reservation. 
However, there will certainly be cases in which both definitions are 
satisfied—where, for example, a tort occurs within the geographical 
boundaries of a reservation under circumstances in which the tribe 
would have authority to regulate the tortfeasor’s conduct.  When this 
is the case, the conclusion seems inescapable that, under most 
choice-of-law principles, tribal law should apply; what, other than 
tribal law, could possibly qualify as the “law of the place”?  Indeed, if 
one takes seriously some of the Court’s language in Wold II,177 
application of state law under such circumstances might be 
preempted under federal law as conflicting with federal policies 
promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government. 
Many other situations exist in which state courts should in theory 
have little difficulty applying tribal law.  The factor of domicile, for 
example, is surely satisfied when a litigant is a tribe member and lives 
on the reservation.  Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that a party 
who is a member of the tribe and performs an action on tribal trust 
land expects that tribal law will apply to his conduct; in states that 
place weight on the factor of party expectations, therefore, a strong 
argument would exist that tribal law should apply under such 
                                                          
 175. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353 (2001) (suggesting that ownership 
of tribal land is only one factor and alone insufficient to “support regulatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers”). 
 176. The question of which law “applies” to particular events is a somewhat 
circular one when the subject under discussion is choice-of-law doctrine.  When a 
case concerning certain events is brought before a state court, the law that “applies” 
to those events will be the law of whatever sovereign the court chooses to apply.  In a 
more narrow sense, however, it can be said that state law, rather than tribal law, 
applies to certain events taking place within the reservation because the tribe has no 
power to exercise its regulatory authority over those events. 
 177. See Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g 
(“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986) (describing a requirement that tribes submit to 
state law as a prerequisite to access to state court as a “severe intrusion” on their 
sovereignty). 
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circumstances.  Finally, many states have adopted by statute choice-of-
law principles that appear to allow for the application of tribal law.  
For example, provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code allow 
parties to a contract great latitude to select what law should apply.178  
Under such statutes, there is no apparent barrier to allowing parties 
to elect by contract to have tribal law apply to contracts involving 
tribes or their members.179 
2.  The question of legislative authority 
The cases described above are the “easy” cases—cases in which 
state choice-of-law principles dictate the application of tribal law even 
if concepts like “place” and “domicile” are given their narrowest 
possible meaning.  Such cases do not, however, exhaust the 
circumstances under which tribal law might apply to cases that 
appear in state court.   In fact, to take such a narrow view would be an 
anomaly in state choice-of-law practice given that states generally 
construe such concepts expansively.  Under the normal application 
of state choice-of-law principles, therefore, one can make a case that 
tribal law should apply to certain cases in which the tribe would lack 
legislative authority to regulate the underlying conduct.   
Although this may seem a controversial suggestion, it is in fact 
highly consistent with general state choice-of-law practices.  For 
example, where state-to-state conflicts of law are concerned, courts 
have generally assumed that “place” refers to any location within a 
state or nation’s geographical boundaries, not to the abstract reach of 
that entity’s sovereign authority.180  This is even true, perhaps even 
especially so, in states that follow the traditional principles of the First 
Restatement, which are designed to establish bright-line, formalistic 
rules that apply regardless of real-world conditions.181  The famous 
                                                          
 178. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1999) (parties may agree that their rights and duties will 
be governed by the law of a non-forum state or nation if such law bears a “reasonable 
relation” to the transaction). 
 179. In practice, such situations have been relatively uncommon, since contractual 
clauses specifying that tribal law will be applied to disputes often also require that 
suits be brought in tribal court.  Nonetheless, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hicks, it may be the case that parties have a greater ability to elect that their dispute 
be governed by tribal law than they do to ensure that their case will be heard in a 
tribal forum.  See supra note 113. 
 180. The majority of states have followed the geographic approaches of traditional 
choice-of-law doctrine articulated in the First and Second Restatement.  Symeonides, 
supra note 151, at 944. 
 181. Though the court in Carroll used Beale’s now-discredited vested rights 
approach as a rationale for reaching this result, most courts that still subscribe to 
traditional principles have applied them based on other justifications, such as that of 
predictability and ease of administration.  See, e.g., Paul v. Nat’l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 
(W. Va. 1986). 
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case of Alabama Great Southern RR Co. v. Carroll,182 for example, 
involved a train passing through several Southern states.  Negligent 
maintenance of the train in Alabama caused a link between two cars 
in a freight train to break in Mississippi, injuring the plaintiff.183  
Although the plaintiff claimed that Alabama law should apply,184 the 
court nonetheless applied Mississippi law because it was in Mississippi 
that the injury had occurred.185  The court reached this conclusion 
despite the fact that Mississippi would certainly have had no power to 
pass laws directly regulating the maintenance of trains in Alabama.  
While the doctrinal reasons why tribes cannot directly regulate most 
nonmember conduct are of course somewhat different from the 
reasons Mississippi cannot regulate conduct outside its borders, it is 
difficult to see why the two situations should be, for choice-of-law 
purposes, distinguishable.186 
Indeed, in certain cases under the traditional approach, the courts 
of the state whose law is to be applied may lack both adjudicative and 
regulatory jurisdiction over the matter; this might be the case if, for 
example, a state’s long-arm statute allows for only limited jurisdiction 
over nonresidents in state court.187  Thus, one could make the 
argument that if states were to apply the more restrictive view of the 
notion of “law of the place,” as described above, to cases with tribal 
contacts, they would in fact be departing from ordinary choice-of-law 
practice.  It is, therefore, perfectly in keeping with normal state 
choice-of-law principles to view “place” as geographical place.  Under 
traditional lex loci delicti principles, tribal law should apply to many 
cases that arise in an Indian “place”—even if that place is, for 
example, privately owned nonmember land within the boundaries of 
a reservation. 
                                                          
 182. 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892). 
 183. Id. at 805. 
 184. Because Mississippi law followed the rule immunizing employers from 
liability for accidents caused by a fellow employee, plaintiffs could state a claim only 
under the law of Alabama, which had abandoned this rule.  Id. 
 185. Id. at 809. 
 186. By way of analogy, a federal criminal statute incorporating tribal law has been 
held to apply even in cases where the tribe itself would not have the power to 
prosecute the underlying violation.  The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (1981), 
makes it a criminal violation to buy or sell fish or wildlife taken in violation of any 
United States or tribal law.  Federal convictions under the Act have been sustained 
even where the tribe would not itself have the authority to enforce its laws against the 
defendant.  See, e.g., United States v. Big Eagle, 881 F.2d 539, 540 (8th Cir. 1989).  See 
also COHEN, supra note 24, § 7.06[2], at 653 (noting that application of tribal law in 
choice-of-law analysis may be appropriate even where the tribe would lack legislative 
jurisdiction to regulate the underlying conduct). 
 187. See supra note 97 (identifying cases in which states lack ordinary regulatory 
jurisdiction, while plainly wielding adjudicative jurisdiction). 
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In states that follow more modern, multifactor choice-of-law 
theories, the path to application of tribal law may be, if anything, 
even clearer.  In fact, once one overcomes the initial hurdle of 
translating choice-of-law concepts to the Indian-law context, certain 
of the “modern” approaches—in particular, interest analysis and the 
“most significant relationship” approach of the Second 
Restatement—lend themselves peculiarly well to cases involving tribal 
contacts.188 
Consider first how theories incorporating interest analysis might 
apply.  Suppose a tribe—call it Tribe A—enacts an ordinance 
requiring creditors to seek authorization from the tribe before 
repossessing property from a tribe member residing on the 
reservation.189  The governmental policy reflected in this rule is fairly 
clear:  to protect the tribe members from arbitrary or unwarranted 
seizures of property.  Further, the nature of the governmental policy 
underlying the ordinance does not change simply because, under 
Strate and Hicks, the tribe’s ability to enforce it against nonmembers 
in tribal court is limited.190  Tribe A, that is, likely has an equal interest 
in protecting its members from unfair seizures by members and those 
by nonmembers; it simply lacks jurisdiction to hold nonmembers 
accountable for their conduct in tribal court. 
Now suppose that, under the law of State B, a secured creditor in 
general has the right to use self-help to repossess property on which a 
debtor has defaulted.  Let us assume that State B has passed this law 
in order to protect the financial interest of in-state corporations that 
have agreed to sell goods on credit.191  In any given case, however, this 
interest may or may not be implicated.  If, for example, the original 
                                                          
 188. In fact, such methods bear some similarities to courts’ current forum-
centered approach.  See Pearson, supra note 5, at 726 (noting that “[f]ederal 
[jurisdictional] law about Indians is a type of ‘interest analysis,’ a concept central to 
modern doctrine on Conflicts of Law”).  See also COHEN, supra note 24, § 7.06[2], at 
653 (suggesting that interest analysis might lead state courts to apply tribal law in 
some cases). 
 189. See, e.g., Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 68 (N.M. 2003) 
(describing situation where an Indian defendant counterclaimed against the 
collection-agency plaintiff for failing to obtain the defendant’s consent or a tribal 
court order before repossessing defendant’s car). 
 190. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (limiting tribes’ civil 
authority to situations where a nonmember enters into consensual relationship with 
the tribe or when the activity directly affects the tribe’s political integrity, economic 
security, health or welfare); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (arguing that 
the mere existence of tribal ownership is not sufficient to confer regulatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers). 
 191. This was the case in Belone.  New Mexico had adopted the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which gives secured parties the right to use self-help in 
repossessing property.  Belone, 74 P.3d at 68-69 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-503 
(1978) (repealed 2001)). 
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deal had been struck in State C between a Tribe A member and a 
State C corporation, and the Tribe A member sued in State B court 
for violation of the tribal statute,192 State B would have no interest in 
applying its law, while Tribe A would have an interest in ensuring the 
security of its member’s property.  Under Currie’s view, this would 
therefore constitute a “false conflict” to which Tribe A law should 
apply.193 
If the corporation were in fact located in State B, of course, a real 
conflict would exist—Tribe A’s interest in protecting its members and 
State B’s interest in protecting its creditors could not both be 
accommodated.  Currie’s approach would, in such a situation, apply 
forum law.194  However, other governmental-interest-based theories, 
such as Leflar’s “better law” principle or Baxter’s “comparative 
impairment” approach, might by contrast point toward tribal law.195  
Whatever the outcome, however, each of these theories has the 
advantage of allowing state courts to step back from the case-
allocation rules established by Montana and Williams to consider what 
stake the tribe actually has in any given case.  Unlike Montana and 
Williams, that is, which give different weight to a tribe’s interests in 
litigation depending on whether a tribe member is a plaintiff or 
defendant and whether the other litigant involved is Indian or non-
Indian, governmental interest analysis allows state courts to take into 
account a tribe’s legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its 
members in all of these situations.196 
Approaches that rely on assessing the quantity and significance of 
contacts with various jurisdictions—predominantly taken by the 
Second Restatement—are also well suited to the tribal-law context.  
In state-to-state conflicts, these approaches are often derided as mere 
“contact-counting.”197  In the tribal-law context, however, where the 
                                                          
 192. The original deal in Belone was reached in Arizona, although the contract was 
later assigned to a New Mexico corporation.  Id. at 68. 
 193. See Currie, supra note 131, at 238 (examining instances of false conflicts 
where the states’ laws may differ, but only one state has a genuine interest in the 
application of its law). 
 194. See Currie, supra note 131, at 178 (reasoning that forum law should apply 
unless the forum state lacked an interest and the foreign state had an interest). 
 195. Compare Baxter, supra note 139, at 18 (proposing that courts should resolve 
conflicts between state laws by determining which of the state’s internal objectives 
will be “least impaired . . . by subordination” to the other state’s interest), with Leflar, 
supra note 140, at 1586-88 (advocating the consideration of multiple factors to 
resolve conflicts in the interest of public policy). 
 196. See Currie, supra note 131, at 178 (suggesting that “to effectuate the legislative 
purpose,” courts should “inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is 
such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application 
of that policy”). 
 197. See SHREVE, supra note 132, at 190 (discussing the reception of the Second 
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people who reside on reservations often have varying levels of tribal 
affiliation, an approach that relies on assessing the number and 
quality of contacts may be the best way to establish whether a given 
resident, or a given case, has meaningful or only incidental 
connections with the tribe.  A state court applying the Second 
Restatement might choose, for example, to apply state rather than 
tribal law in a tort action involving a tourist with no ties to the tribe, 
whose negligent conduct occurred off the reservation, even if the 
injury itself occurred in Indian country.198  By the same token, in a 
case concerning a defendant who lives and works within reservation 
boundaries, who is married to a tribe member,199 and whose negligent 
conduct occurred on tribal land, the decision to apply tribal law may 
be a relatively easy one, even if the defendant is not technically a 
member of the tribe.  Thus, unlike current doctrine, which often 
assigns cases to a state or tribal forum based on a single factor, such as 
the defendant’s identity,200 the Second Restatement approach allows 
the many factors that may be applicable in a case with tribal contacts 
to be given appropriate weight.201 
Finally, as the third Section explores in more detail, exceptions 
common to most choice-of-law systems may also be particularly 
helpful in the tribal context.  Many states, for example, permit courts 
to avoid application of a jurisdiction’s law, even if choice-of-law 
principles would otherwise call for it, on grounds that it is against 
public policy.202  While this exception has sometimes been criticized 
for giving courts too much discretion to make policy choices, it may 
be a useful escape device to allow state courts to avoid the application 
                                                          
Restatement by the academic community, ranging from praise and mixed 
impressions to criticism). 
 198. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 721 (noting that under the Second Restatement, 
the law of the state where the injury occurred will usually apply). 
 199. Many tribes, for example, may require a certain blood quantum for 
membership.  Thus, tribe members’ spouses and relatives may be ineligible, but are 
clearly members of the community.  See, e.g.,  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 
443 (1997) (illustrating the requirement for a certain blood quantum for 
membership where the plaintiff, while not a tribe member, had a husband and 
children who were members). 
 200. See, e.g., Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) 
(remanding case to determine whether the defendant was Indian or non-Indian for 
the purposes of evaluating jurisdiction). 
 201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (including 
factors such as the place of conduct causing the injury; the domicile, residence, and 
place of business of the parties; and the place where the parties’ relationship was 
based). 
 202. See Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 
735 (1990) (“Although it remains controversial, most courts consider, either 
explicitly or implicitly, which set of applicable laws is better as a matter of social 
policy and justice.”). 
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of tribal law in situations where the matter at issue is clearly an 
internal tribal one and state-court involvement would offend tribal 
autonomy. 
3.  The actual experience of state courts 
On a theoretical level, therefore, there appear to be few obstacles 
to applying any of the major choice-of-law theories to cases involving 
tribal contacts.  In practice, too, nontribal courts that have explicitly 
considered the issue have had relatively little difficulty in concluding 
that choice-of-law principles may under certain circumstances dictate 
the application of tribal law.  In Tempest Recovery Services v. Belone,203 for 
example, a member of the Navajo Nation, living outside the 
boundaries of the reservation on allotted Indian land in New Mexico, 
defaulted on payments for a car purchased in Arizona.204  The 
installment contract provided that the “law of the state where the 
property is repossessed” would govern the transaction.205  Tempest, 
the car dealer, entered Belone’s allotted land, repossessed the car, 
and sued in New Mexico court for the outstanding balance.206  Belone 
counterclaimed for damages, citing a Navajo law providing that 
“[t]he personal property of Navajo Indians shall not be taken from 
the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation” unless authorized by 
Navajo judicial process or the purchaser’s written consent.207 
The court first found that, under Williams, it had jurisdiction over 
Tempest’s claim (because it had arisen outside Indian country) and 
over Belone’s (because, while Belone’s cause of action had arisen in 
Indian country, Belone had chosen to bring his counterclaim in state 
court).208 Finding that the tribe had “territorial jurisdiction” over 
Indian country, the court concluded that a “choice-of-law issue . . . 
follow[ed]” from the fact that Belone’s counterclaim had arisen 
there, and remanded the case to allow the district court to determine, 
“under choice-of-law rules,” whether New Mexico or Navajo law 
applied.209 
                                                          
 203. 74 P.3d 67, 68 (N.M. 2003). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 69.  The court found that this constituted, under New Mexico choice-of-
law doctrine, an effective contractual choice of law.  Id.  The court took care to note, 
however, that Navajo law contained an equivalent contractual choice-of-law 
provision.  Id. 
 206. Id. at 68. 
 207. Id. at 69. 
 208. Id. at 71-72. 
 209. Id. at 71, 71 n.2 (“State courts applying normal choice of law principles 
should frequently apply tribal law to issues arising in Indian Country.”) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  The court’s reasoning was murky in some respects; the 
court apparently assumed that the parties had intended their contract to be 
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One of the more notable aspects of the case was the court’s 
decision to treat the Navajo Nation as a separate sovereign for choice-
of-law purposes, and its conclusion that any part of Indian country 
should be treated as Navajo “territory” for purposes of determining 
where a claim had arisen.210  In other words, the court did not analyze 
the applicability of Navajo law by examining in detail whether the 
tribe would have had regulatory or adjudicatory authority over the 
transaction under the Montana test.211  Instead, it simply assumed, in 
essence, that any location within Indian country constituted a Navajo 
“place” for the purpose of determining, under state choice-of-law 
principles, whether Navajo law should apply. 
Similarly, in Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc.,212 a case involving the same 
Navajo repossession law, an Arizona appellate court suggested that 
circumstances might exist under which comity would dictate 
application of tribal law under choice-of-law principles.  Although the 
court ultimately concluded that the parties had made a valid 
contractual election of Arizona law,213 it left open the possibility that 
the principle of comity might under different circumstances oblige a 
state court to apply tribal law.214  Although the court questioned 
whether the Navajo Nation was genuinely an “independent sovereign 
jurisdiction,” it nevertheless noted that, applying principles of comity, 
Arizona had given effect to Navajo court decisions.215  As a result, the 
court concluded, 
[I]f a sufficient independent status exists in the Navajo Tribe for 
the courts of this state to recognize the validity of Navajo Tribal 
Court decisions, then, under principles of comity, like recognition 
should be extended to legislative enactments of the Navajo Tribal 
Council, provided, of course, such legislative enactments are not 
contrary to the public policy of this state.216 
                                                          
governed by New Mexico choice-of-law principles, but not New Mexico substantive 
law.  Thus, the court applied New Mexico choice-of-law doctrine to determine where 
the counterclaim had arisen, but appeared to assume that, because that place was 
Indian country, Navajo substantive law should apply.  See id. at 72. 
 210. See id. at 72 n.3 (upholding the Supreme Court’s recognition of the authority 
of tribal courts and the need to apply an “exhaustion doctrine” allowing a tribal 
court to determine its own jurisdiction before a federal court can hear the case). 
 211. In passing, the court did cite Montana, as well as an earlier New Mexico case, 
Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088, 1092 (N.M. App. 1997), in which 
the court had held that, on similar facts, the Navajo court would have civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers.  Belone, 74 P.3d at 71-72. 
 212. 571 P.2d 689, 690 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 695. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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Again, the court did not limit potential application of tribal law to 
situations in which the tribe would have adjudicative jurisdiction.  
Instead, the court suggested that since Arizona courts treated the 
Navajo Nation as a sister sovereign for one purpose—enforcing the 
judgments of tribal courts—it should also treat it as a sovereign in 
other respects, such as the application of tribal law under choice-of-
law principles. 
Several federal cases have addressed nearly identical choice-of-law 
issues in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),217 which 
waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for tortious acts that 
occur within the United States, specifying that courts should apply 
“the law of the place where the omission occurred.”218  For many 
years, courts ignored the potential applicability of tribal law when an 
accident occurred in Indian country, applying state law to all issues 
even when tribal lands were involved.219  In 1999, however, a federal 
district court in Cheromiah v. United States220 changed the terms of 
debate by applying tribal law to a malpractice suit arising from actions 
that occurred at a federally operated hospital on tribal lands. 
The question at issue in Cheromiah was whether a New Mexico state 
cap on medical malpractice damages should govern a claim arising 
out of allegedly negligent treatment at an Indian Health Services 
facility on the Acoma reservation.221  Plaintiffs argued that Acoma 
tribal law, which had no damage cap, constituted the “law of the 
place where the omission occurred” under the federal statute.222  
Departing from prior interpretations, the court agreed, rejecting the 
view that “law of the place” means exclusively “law of the state.”223 
                                                          
 217. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2001). 
 218. See, e.g., Washabaugh v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 623, 625 (M.D. Pa. 1949) 
(concluding that in a car accident between a Pennsylvania resident and a U.S. Army 
station wagon, Maryland’s standards and tests determined whether the claim had 
been established and what recovery was appropriate). 
 219. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 696 (describing several circuit decisions involving 
Indian parties or Indian land). 
 220. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999). 
 221. Id. at 1297. 
 222. Id. at 1301-02. 
 223. See id. at 1305-06 (distinguishing the instant case from other interpretations, 
noting that the application of tribal law was never raised on the FTCA claims).  The 
Cheromiah court was not obliged to consider the more problematic situation 
described above, in which an action arose on an identifiably tribal “place” over which 
the tribe might be found to lack regulatory or adjudicative jurisdiction—such as a 
tort committed by a nonmember defendant on tribal land.  See id. at 1297 
(describing the hospital, where doctors failed to diagnose or treat a bacterial 
infection that caused an individual’s death as “located within the bounds of Acoma 
tribal land”).  This is because the FTCA imposes an additional requirement, 
subjecting the United States to liability only “under circumstances where [it], if a 
private person, would be liable.”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).  Because of this 
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In another FTCA claim, Louis v. United States,224 the court disagreed 
with Cheromiah and concluded that Congress did not intend “place” 
in the FTCA to refer to Indian country.225  Interestingly, however, the 
court went on to suggest that, even if “law of the place” meant New 
Mexico law, tribal law could nonetheless potentially be applied to the 
claim under New Mexico choice-of-law principles.226  The plaintiff 
argued that, because New Mexico followed the lex loci delicti doctrine, 
tribal law should govern because the negligent conduct had occurred 
at a tribal hospital.227  Because the plaintiff had, however, ultimately 
died in a New Mexico hospital, the court found that the hospital was 
the place of the wrong and rejected this argument.228  However, by 
accepting that ordinary New Mexico choice-of-law principles applied, 
the Louis court implicitly left open the possibility that application of 
tribal law might have been proper had the plaintiff’s death occurred 
within the boundaries of Indian country.229 
The application of choice-of-law principles to events in Indian 
country is thus often surprisingly straightforward.  Conversely, state 
courts that have gone to great lengths to avoid application of tribal 
                                                          
requirement, the court was obliged to undertake the analysis of whether the tribe 
would have jurisdiction over a private person in this situation under the principles of 
Montana and Strate.  Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.  In this case, because the 
United States had entered into a contract to provide medical services to the Acoma, 
the court concluded that the tribe would have had jurisdiction under Montana’s 
exception for consensual relationships.  Id. at 1304.  The court also found that 
because the hospital was the sole source of western medical care for nearly all 
Acoma, its alleged malpractice was more than an “isolated tort;” it had the potential 
to “jeopardize [the Acoma’s] very ability to survive as a people,” thus triggering 
Montana’s second exception.  Id. at 1305. 
 224. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999). 
 225. See id. at 1210 (reasoning that New Mexico law would determine the scope of 
the government’s liability). 
 226. Id. at 1211. 
 227. Id. at 1210. 
 228. Id. at 1211.  As a choice-of-law matter, this was the correct result.  Lex loci 
delicti principles look to the place where the cause of action first became complete—
i.e., where the injuries resulting from tortious conduct ultimately manifested 
themselves. 
 229. A few courts have rejected Cheromiah’s conclusion, relying instead on older 
precedents that treat “law of the place” as synonymous with “law of the state.”  See, 
e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1268 (D.N.M. 2002) 
(citing various cases, none of which involved an event that occurred on reservation 
lands); Bryant v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (D. Ariz. 2000) (declining to 
follow Cheromiah because the cases upon which the Cheromiah court relied were 
distinguishable and dealt with situations where the location of the negligent act was 
not within the boundaries of any state).  Other courts have considered the issue by 
avoiding application of tribal law without directly rejecting Cheromiah’s reasoning.  
See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 242 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).  In Williams, the 
Fourth Circuit acknowledged conflicting decisions on the question of whether tribal 
law should be applied, but ultimately found that it need not decide the issue because 
no Cherokee law existed on the subject and “any tribal resolution would look, in 
these circumstances, to applicable federal and North Carolina law.”  Id. at 176 n.2. 
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law have often found themselves tied in doctrinal knots.  The South 
Dakota case of Risse v. Meeks230 is a stark example of the procedural 
tangles the current forum-centered regime can create.  The case 
involved the non-Indian Risses, residing on off-reservation land in 
South Dakota, who brought a suit in state court against the Meeks, 
three members of the Ogala Sioux Tribe living on the reservation, 
after cattle bearing the Meeks’ brands entered the Risses’ property.231  
The Risses alleged claims for trespass, for which they sought 
compensatory damages.232  Based on the Meeks’ alleged failure to 
install a fence, the Risses also sought punitive damages for “willful, 
wanton, and reckless conduct.”233 
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over 
the first claim, but not the second.234  The first action, for trespass, was 
based on damage to the Risses’ land, which was “undisputedly not 
Indian Country.”235  The second cause of action, however, hinged on 
the Meeks’ failure to construct a fence.236  Under South Dakota law, 
fences were a “fixture and part of the realty,” and the claim therefore 
arose on Indian trust land, over which the court lacked jurisdiction.237  
In a thoughtful concurrence, Justice Konenkamp defended the result 
on the ground that tribes should have the right to set standards of 
conduct on tribal land.238  The state of South Dakota, he noted, 
lacked regulatory authority over “the construction and maintenance 
of fences in Indian country;” thus, “imposing punitive damages for 
fencing decisions on the reservation allows the state to do indirectly 
what it could never do directly.”239  Instead, tribal courts should have 
the ability to decide questions pertaining to “the alleged wrongful use 
and possession of land located in Indian Country by a tribal Indian 
defendant.”240  To hold otherwise, would be to violate the principle 
that Indians possessed the sovereign right to “make their own laws 
and be governed by them.”241 
                                                          
 230. 585 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1998). 
 231. Id. at 875-76. 
 232. Id. at 876. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 877, 879. 
 235. Id. at 877. 
 236. Id. at 876. 
 237. Id. at 878. 
 238. See id. at 879 (Konenkamp, J., concurring) (criticizing the dissent for 
“ignor[ing] well-settled exceptions to the rule against splitting causes of actions”). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (quoting Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 487 (S.D. 1968) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 241. Id. (quoting Kain, 83 S.D. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The force of Konenkamp’s argument, however, was entirely 
dependent on the view that the Risses’ lawsuit could be seen as 
asserting two entirely different claims—one relating to actions on 
state territory, and one concerning internal reservation matters.  By 
contrast, the dissenting justices viewed the trespass as a single cause 
of action.242  A dissent by Justice Amundson243 emphasized that 
splitting the case would be an “odd procedure” because the punitive 
damages claim “merely constitute[d] an element of recovery on the 
underlying cause of action[,] . . . not an independent or additional 
cause of action which can be separated and stand on its own.”244  As 
Amundson noted, what the court was doing in effect was not splitting 
claims but splitting different sorts of evidence relating to a single 
claim—evidence relating to the claim for compensatory damages in 
state court and evidence relating to the “punitive damage portion of 
the claim” in tribal court.245  Notably, Amundson recognized that state 
law should not be imposed on the tribal defendants with respect to 
the punitive damages claim; instead, “[t]he conduct that may warrant 
punitive damages, if any, will have to be evaluated based upon the 
rules or laws of the place where the conduct occurs, namely tribal 
land.”246 
As the dissenting justices appeared to recognize, choice-of-law 
analysis might have clarified the court’s analysis and simplified 
decision of an essentially uncomplicated case.  Had the court instead 
considered the option of applying Ogala Sioux law to the question of 
punitive damages, it would have been able to answer Justice 
Konenkamp’s objection that the state should not be in the business 
of imposing standards of conduct in Indian country without the need 
to artificially separate the claim into two parts.  In other words, Ogala 
Sioux standards of conduct would continue to govern how the Meeks 
fenced their farm, but the plaintiffs would not have been forced to 
split their cause of action between two forums.  
                                                          
 242. See generally id. at 881-84 (Admundson & Sabers, JJ., dissenting). 
 243. Justice Sabers, who also dissented, saw things similarly.  He first observed 
that, “[t]he dispositive principle of law in this case is the majority rule that an action 
for trespass to real property must be brought where the real property is situated,” 
thus necessitating that the trespass claim be brought in state court rather than tribal 
court.  Id. at 881.  In Sabers’ view, the punitive damages claim was “not a separate or 
independent cause of action,” but a “dependent, ancillary punitive damage claim.”  
Id.  Thus, there was no need to create a “multiplicity of suits” by forcing the Risses to 
split their claim between state and tribal court.  Id. at 882. 
 244. Id. at 883. 
 245. Id. at 884. 
 246. Id. at 883-84 n.5. 
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This case also illustrates how the rule of Williams places excessive 
emphasis on the form of a lawsuit.  The decision to define the Risses’ 
punitive damages claim as a separate cause of action meant that the 
state lacked power to assert jurisdiction over it, since under Williams, 
state courts are not permitted to hear suits against Indian defendants 
arising out of on-reservation transactions.247  By contrast, if the 
punitive damages claim had been defined as part of the Risses’ state-
law cause of action, Williams would presumably impose no barrier to 
allowing it to be heard in state court.248  Under Risse, therefore, 
whether the tribe had any say in setting standards of conduct for its 
members essentially hinged on a quirk of South Dakota procedure—
that is, whether South Dakota regarded a particular legal demand as 
constituting two claims or one.249 
4.  Procedural advantages of the choice-of-law approach 
The preceding Section has suggested some of the ways in which a 
choice-of-law approach would often be more fair, predictable, and 
efficient than the current way in which most states treat cases with 
                                                          
 247. See id. at 878 (adhering to the proposition that “[i]t is common ground here 
that Indian conduct occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the State’s 
jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern of tribal or federal authorities”). 
 248. See id. at 878-79 (noting that courts have rejected personal dissatisfaction with 
tribal court jurisdiction as a valid basis for obtaining jurisdiction in another court 
system). 
 249. Even when a case does not present such complicated procedural 
conundrums, state courts’ reluctance to apply tribal law may lead to unfair results 
and cause states to distort the way in which their choice-of-law principles are 
normally applied.  In Warm Springs Forest Products Industries v. Employee Benefits 
Insurance Company, 716 P.2d 740, 741 (Or. 1986), the Oregon Supreme Court 
applied Oregon law to a dispute between a non-Indian insurer and its insured, a 
tribal enterprise owned by the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation 
of Oregon, despite arguments by  the tribal enterprise that the parties had intended 
for Warm Springs law  to apply.  In reaching this conclusion, the court seemed to rely 
as much on the fact that discovering the applicable tribal law might be burdensome 
as on any convincing evidence of the parties’ intentions, a position for which it was 
criticized by  the dissent.  Id. at 748-49.  Notably, the majority explicitly rejected 
Warm Springs’ argument that Oregon’s choice-of-law principles dictated the 
application of tribal law.  Id. at 743.   Application of Oregon law had the effect of 
invalidating an oral rebate agreement, which the plaintiff alleged was the main 
reason it had purchased the policy.  Thus, the tribe argued, Oregon law should not 
be applied under the Second Restatement, which provided that “a contractual choice 
to apply foreign law which is contrary to the fundamental public policy of the place 
where the contract is made and performed will not be given effect.”  Id. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971)).   Rejecting this 
argument, the court found (over  the dissent’s strong objections) that interpreting 
the policy to make an election of Oregon law would not be contrary to tribal policy.  
Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a provision of Warm Springs law 
that stated that Oregon law was to be applied Oregon law to tribal matters where it 
did not conflict with “Indian written or customary law.”  Id.  But the court refused to 
undertake the examination of whether such conflicting Indian law existed in the first 
instance, making its reasoning inevitably somewhat circular. 
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tribal contacts.  The advantages of a choice-of-law approach, however, 
extend much more broadly.  Most fundamentally, such a practice 
would acknowledge a growing reality:  that the extent of tribal 
adjudicative and regulatory jurisdiction is frequently much narrower 
than the scope of what most courts would acknowledge as tribes’ 
legitimate interests.250 For example, when nonmembers are 
responsible for torts whose effects are felt within a reservation’s 
borders, all members of the tribe may feel that their safety and 
security has decreased. The tribe, however, is likely to lack authority 
either to regulate the nonmember’s behavior directly or to require 
the matter to be heard in tribal court.  Allowing state courts to apply 
tribal law in such circumstances has the potential to promote tribal 
autonomy and self-determination by providing a way in which tribal 
interests can be taken into account.251 
A choice-of-law approach, however, also has more practical 
procedural benefits.  To begin with, choice-of-law analysis has the 
potential to introduce a welcome element of territoriality into state 
courts’ approach to claims arising on Indian reservations.  As the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of tribal legislative authority has 
increasingly focused on tribal membership rather than on the 
boundaries of reservations or of Indian country, tribes’ ability to 
influence events that occur within their borders has been severely 
weakened.252  Yet borders and a sense of place remain central to the 
way most people conceive of sovereign nationhood, and decisions 
based on territory foster a greater sense of certainty and 
predictability.253  Applying a choice-of-law approach that contains a 
territorial component would heighten the significance of whether or 
not an event occurs within “Indian country,” and thus allow tribal 
sovereignty to have a surer geographical reach. 
Moreover, choice-of-law methodologies generally allow courts some 
flexibility to consider the facts of the case in an individualized way, a 
                                                          
 250. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 702 (acknowledging the two exceptions to the 
Supreme Court’s general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority:  “The first 
exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe 
or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe’s political 
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.”) (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997)). 
 251. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999), for an 
in-depth consideration of this perspective. 
 252. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 202-05 (discussing Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544 (1981), and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)). 
 253. See Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1307 (offering that those domiciled in a 
state, in order to change the political decisions that govern their lives, may either 
vote or exit, thus enabling individuals to control the legal norms to which the 
individuals will be subjected). 
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quality particularly helpful in sorting out the tangled mixture of state 
and tribal contacts that often characterizes state-court cases involving 
Indians.  Applying choice-of-law principles, a court could, for 
example, decide that, of the plaintiff’s several related claims, some 
should be governed by state law and some by tribal law.  By contrast, 
under a scheme that assumes each forum will apply its own law, a 
plaintiff whose case involves both state and reservation contacts is 
compelled to split her case between state and tribal court if she wants 
tribal law to apply to any of her claims. 
Further, because the choice of which law to apply is not a question 
of jurisdiction, it can be made in combination with a determination 
of the merits of the case.  By contrast, if jurisdiction is uncertain, the 
court will often be forced to engage in an extensive, fact-specific 
inquiry before it has even established that it has the power to hear the 
case.  In particular, a choice-of-law approach that looks to the 
number and quality of contacts between a defendant and the tribe 
simply has more inherent flexibility than a forum-centered approach, 
allowing courts to consider often-complex issues (such as the degree 
of affiliation between a given litigant and a tribe) in a more precise, 
case-by-case manner.254 
Encouraging state courts to apply tribal law in situations like the 
ones described has the potential to create more consistent results and 
reduce the possibilities for forum-shopping.  Under a solely forum-
based approach, whether state law or tribal law applies to a case may 
be dictated by who sues whom first, and therefore whether the case is 
assigned to state or tribal court.  Further, where states and tribes have 
concurrent jurisdiction, the absence of well-defined rules and 
procedures for managing inter-jurisdictional conflicts encourages 
litigants to forum shop aggressively and creates the potential for 
procedural quagmires.255  State and tribal courts may, for example, 
                                                          
 254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (expanding 
the court’s consideration in conflicts of law situations to factors such as the place of 
conduct causing a injury; the domicile, residence, and place of business of the 
parties; and the place where the parties’ relationship was based). 
 255. A particularly egregious example is the case of Teague v. Bad River Band 
(Teague I), 612 N.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Wis. 2000), which presented a dizzying array of 
interforum conflicts.  A non-Indian contractor filed suit in state court alleging that 
the Bad River Band had waived its sovereign immunity.  Id.  The Band, meanwhile, 
took the case to tribal court for resolution of the same question.  Id. at 713.  In part 
because the contractor refused to participate in the tribal proceedings, the tribal 
court swiftly reached a judgment in the Band’s favor.  The state trial court, however, 
refused to give full faith and credit to the tribal judgment, finding that that the 
Band’s filing of the second suit in tribal court constituted fraud and coercion; 
further, it reached an opposite result on the substantive tribal-immunity question.  
Id. at 712-13.  Faced with an unappetizing choice between rewarding “the winner of 
the race to the courthouse” or “the winner of the race to judgment,” id. at 714, 717, 
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compete to be the first to reach judgments.  Litigants who suspect 
that tribal proceedings will fail to go their way may choose to ignore 
them in hopes that their nonparticipation will cast doubt on the 
proceedings’ legitimacy.256  When jurisdiction is available in two 
courts with sharply different cultural and legal perspectives, forum 
choice may be entirely determinative of the outcome, heightening 
incentives for procedural maneuvering and casting doubt on the 
legitimacy of both courts’ proceedings.257   
 Under a choice-of-law approach, however, which law applies is 
determined by factors such as the place of relevant events and the 
domicile of the litigants that remain constant regardless of the 
configuration of the lawsuit.258  Encouraging state courts to apply 
tribal law in appropriate circumstances thus fulfills a classic function 
of choice-of-law doctrine—avoiding a situation in which a plaintiff’s 
choice of court determines a case’s outcome.   
 Finally, an advantage of interest analysis and Second Restatement 
approaches in particular would be to allow courts to separate the 
interest of tribal litigants from the interest of the tribe itself, and to 
allow both to be accorded their proper weight.  Under the current, 
forum-based approach, that is, the Supreme Court has rarely 
considered whether the tribe as a whole might have a stake in a given 
case that differs from that of the individual litigants.  In Fisher v. 
District Court, for example, the Court concluded that, because tribal 
adjudication of cases involving internal tribal matters would 
strengthen tribal independence, it was also in the best interests of 
                                                          
the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case for the two courts to confer, 
noting in passing that the adoption of procedures to govern such a situation was 
acutely needed.  Id. at 720.  Despite the state supreme court’s hopes, however, 
cooperation between the state and tribal courts did not result. On remand, the state 
circuit court denied the Band’s request to open the judgment.  Teague v. Bad River 
Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Teague III), 665 N.W.2d 889, 903 
(Wis. 2003). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, hearing the case once again on appeal, 
finally resolved the instant dispute by holding in a fractured opinion that the tribal 
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. Even so, the judges sharply disagreed 
about the rationale. Id. at 903, 916. 
 256. See, e.g., Teague I, 612 N.W.2d at 713. 
 257. In the Teague cases, for example, it was clearly in the non-Indian plaintiff’s 
best interest to have the case decided by a state judge skeptical of the Bad River 
Band’s sovereign immunity argument, while it was equally logical for the Band to 
seek a tribal judge who was more receptive to (and perhaps more knowledgeable 
about) its claims of sovereign immunity under tribal law. 
 258. Id.  Note in particular that a court considering which law to apply under 
choice-of-law doctrine can consider the domicile of both plaintiff and defendant 
under the particular circumstances of the case.  Contra Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 
222-23 (1959) (holding that the presence of a tribal defendant may cause the case to 
be sent to tribal court, but the presence of a tribal plaintiff does not). 
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individual Indian plaintiffs.259  In Wold I and II, the Court took this 
equation in the other direction, assuming that what was in the best 
interest of Indian litigants—ready access to state courts—was also in 
the best interest of tribes.260 
Of course, in many cases, there may be little difference in practice 
between tribal and litigant interests.  For example, cases involving 
tribal contacts that appear in state court often involve tribal 
corporations that are closely linked to the tribal government.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine cases where litigant and tribal 
interests might diverge.  A given Indian litigant, for example, might 
prefer state law because it is more favorable in a certain situation, 
while the tribe might favor a tribal ordinance intended to repair 
relationships between Indian litigants. 
Under current procedure, the interests of Indian litigants will be by 
default given greater weight than the interests of the tribe simply 
because litigants generally have more control over which court hears 
the case.  Where concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction exists, for 
example, Indian plaintiffs have a choice about where to sue; while 
defendants have less obvious control, they may be able to shape the 
litigation in subtler ways—for example, by deciding whether or not to 
press Williams objections when a case against them is brought in state 
court.261  Choice-of-law approaches that allow for some consideration 
of governmental interests would help to redress this balance by 
allowing the tribe’s interests to be taken into account as well. 
In certain circumstances, application of tribal law could benefit 
state courts as well as tribes.  A rule like “law of the place” is simple to 
apply, and state courts might prefer navigating basic choice-of-law 
principles to negotiating the complicated jurisdictional patchwork of 
Montana.262  A state court, therefore, might choose to treat a tribe 
exactly as it does a sister state for choice-of-law purposes in order to 
foster ease of administration and predictable results.  Further, while 
                                                          
 259. See supra n.77 (explaining the Fisher court conclusion that even if a 
jurisdictional holding occasionally denies an Indian plaintiff access to state 
jurisdiction, such treatment is justified and is intended to benefit Indians by 
furthering Indian self-government). 
 260. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.c (examining the degree to which state courts 
were obliged to provide access to Indian plaintiffs suing non-Indian defendants). 
 261. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.a (analyzing the principles set forth by Williams:  
(1) if a non-Indian sues an Indian in a case arising in Indian country, the case must 
be held in tribal court; and (2) in order for tribes to enjoy the right to be ruled by 
their own laws, such laws must be enforced in tribal court). 
 262. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.a (explaining Montana’s two explicit exceptions 
to limits on tribal powers:  (1) activities of nonmembers who enter in consensual 
relationships with the tribes and (2) where conduct of non-Indians threatens the 
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe). 
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states and tribes have historically competed for authority over Indian 
country, the judicial branches of both sovereigns have been moving 
steadily toward greater cooperation.  Many state and tribal courts now 
enjoy friendly relations.263  State courts might, therefore, make the 
comity-based decision to treat tribes as ordinary sovereigns for choice-
of-law purposes in order to help foster the mutually beneficial 
relationships that many state and tribal courts have cultivated. 
III. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF TRIBAL LAW         
IN STATE COURT 
Despite the apparent advantages described above, many state 
courts have been reluctant to apply tribal law under choice-of-law 
principles, and some Indian-law scholars have spoken against the 
practice.  This Part considers the arguments, both doctrinal and 
policy-based, that courts and commentators have made against the 
application of tribal law in state courts.  The first Section focuses on 
fairness to nonmembers, considering whether the application of 
tribal law in state court might be limited by constitutional restrictions 
or principles of federal Indian law that limit tribal sovereignty.  The 
second Section focuses on whether state-court application of tribal 
law is in tension with Supreme Court cases protecting tribal 
autonomy.  Finally, the third Section considers more broadly whether 
state-court application of tribal law should be discouraged because it 
is impractical or not in tribes’ best interests. 
A.  States’ Authority to Apply Tribal Law To Nonmembers of the Tribe 
The first question that must be addressed about the extent of 
states’ authority to apply tribal law is whether tribal law may validly be 
applied to nonmembers.  After all, in the ordinary course of events, 
litigants who are not members of a tribe cannot be made defendants 
in tribal court; further, in most cases, the tribe cannot regulate their 
conduct.  In light of these facts, do Supreme Court precedents permit 
tribal law to be applied to nonmembers at all? 
In considering this question, it is important to note that decisions 
about whether and how to apply tribal law in state court are, in the 
first instance, questions of state law.  Modern courts and 
                                                          
 263. To choose just one example, Carol Tebben describes a Wisconsin county 
where “the chief judge of the state judicial district travels voluntarily to the Lac du 
Flambeau reservation, about forty-five miles each way, to hold court at the tribal 
court for the convenience of tribal members.”  Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the 
Aftermath of Teague:  The Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 177, 188-89 (2001). 
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commentators have definitively rejected the beliefs of Beale and 
other early choice-of-law theorists that a right is “created” when a 
cause of action becomes complete.264  When a state court decides to 
apply state law, therefore, it chooses to do so by its own inherent 
authority, not the tribe’s.  Thus, in the absence of any preempting 
federal dictate, states should be free to apply tribal law if they choose 
to do so. 
Further, the Supreme Court has held that a state court’s power to 
apply any particular state’s law to the dispute before it is restricted 
only by the modest limits imposed by the Due Process Clause.  In the 
key case on the subject, Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague,265 a 
woman whose husband had been killed in a motorcycle accident sued 
in Minnesota court seeking a declaration that her late husband’s 
insurance policies could be “stacked” pursuant to Minnesota law, 
while the insurer argued that Wisconsin law should govern the 
question.266  Although the insurance policy had been delivered in 
Wisconsin, the accident had occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons 
involved in the accident were Wisconsin residents when it occurred, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court nonetheless determined that 
Minnesota law should apply.267 
The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that the 
Minnesota court’s decision satisfied the basic test the Due Process 
clause imposed on state choice-of-law decisions—that the choice be 
“neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”268  This test, the Court 
indicated, would be satisfied if the state whose law was applied had 
any “significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with 
the parties and the occurrence or transaction.”269  As applied in 
Hague, this requirement did not prove to be an onerous one.  As the 
Court noted, Hague had just three contacts in Minnesota:  he worked 
                                                          
 264. J. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 (1916), at 105 (“When a 
right has been created by law, this right itself becomes a fact . . . .  [a] right having 
been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow 
everywhere.”). 
 265. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 266. Id. at 305. 
 267. Id. at 306.  The Minnesota Supreme Court followed Leflar’s approach, 
placing particular weight on Leflar’s “better rule of law” factor—which the court 
concluded in this case pointed in the direction of applying the Minnesota rule 
permitting stacking.  Id. at 306-07. 
 268. Id. at 320.  The Court in fact considered the question under both the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause; the test, however, is identical 
for both.  See id. at 308 n.10.  Because the Full Faith and Credit clause has not 
generally been found to apply to tribes, this discussion considers the test only in 
terms of the Due Process Clause. 
 269. Id. 
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in Minnesota;270 Allstate did business in California;271 and Hague’s 
widow had married a Minnesota resident and moved to Minnesota 
prior to filing the lawsuit.272  Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 
this slim collection of contacts—none of which was directly related to 
the accident, and one of which arose well after the events at issue—
was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.273  The Court 
further observed that states have wide scope to choose which choice-
of-law system to apply, noting that “a set of facts giving rise to a 
lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in 
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one 
jurisdiction.”274 
While Hague concerned a forum’s attempts to apply its own law, the 
Court gave no indication that its holding was limited to application of 
forum law.  Thus, presumably Hague also sets the constitutional 
boundaries for state-court application of tribal law.  Hague would thus 
appear to indicate that, so long as a litigant has contacts with the tribe 
or his actions have some effect on it, there should be no 
constitutional obstacle to the application of tribal law. 
One objection to this analysis might be that, because of the more 
limited nature of tribal sovereignty, a higher constitutional threshold 
exists for the application of tribal law.  The Court has, for example, 
weighed concerns of procedural fairness in determining the extent of 
tribes’ adjudicative jurisdiction.275  Thus, it is possible that the 
application of tribal law to nonmembers might raise special due 
process concerns. 
Yet while it is certainly true that the Supreme Court has not treated 
tribes identically to states or other sovereigns, the Court has given no 
indication that this distinction is relevant for choice-of-law purposes.  
Indeed, the Court has occasionally suggested situations in which the 
application of tribal law might be appropriate.276  Further, in matters 
                                                          
 270. Hague also commuted to work in Minnesota, although the accident did not 
occur during his commute.  Id. at 314-15. 
 271. Id. at 317. 
 272. Id. at 318-19.  While acknowledging that a post-accident move would be 
“insufficient in and of itself” as a basis for the application of a given state’s law, the 
Court nonetheless found that “such a change of residence was [not] irrelevant.”  Id. 
at 319. 
 273. See id. at 311 (finding that the contacts, although few, were “obviously 
significant”). 
 274. Id. at 307. 
 275. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (suggesting that 
nonmembers would be unduly burdened by having to defend a suit in an unfamiliar 
tribal court); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978) 
(expressing concerns about non-Indians being tried by all-Indian juries). 
 276. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Eng’g (“Wold II”), 476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986). 
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involving the law of foreign nations, states have generally dealt with 
conflicts of law in the manner that their usual policies dictate, 
notwithstanding the fact that such choices may have broader 
implications for foreign relations or other federal policies.277  Thus, 
even where a strong federal interest may be present, state courts have 
normally been permitted to treat choice-of-law decisions as an 
internal state matter.278  The same result, therefore, should also apply 
in the tribal context.  This is the result courts appear to have reached 
in practice.  Courts that have considered the peculiar attributes of 
tribal sovereignty in deciding whether to apply tribal law have 
ultimately concluded that tribes should be treated in the same 
manner as other sovereigns.279 
Although application of tribal law by state courts thus seems 
unlikely to raise constitutional questions in the vast majority of cases, 
the question of whether state choice-of-law decisions might ever be 
preempted by federal Indian-law principles is less certain.  The 
Supreme Court has never explicitly discussed the relationship 
between choice-of-law theory, with its territorial emphasis, and the 
more uncertain boundaries of tribal jurisdiction sketched by 
Montana.  As detailed in the preceding discussion, the Court has 
generally—though not universally—assumed that state courts will 
apply state law, even though it has at other points suggested that state 
courts might choose, or even be required, to apply tribal law.  
Therefore, even though the way in which state courts resolve conflicts 
between the law of other jurisdictions is ordinarily a matter of state 
law, principles of federal Indian law might dictate different results 
where tribal law is concerned.  In other words, the Court’s statements 
in Montana and successor cases about federal limitations on tribal 
sovereignty might preempt a state court’s decision to treat a tribe on 
                                                          
 277. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 
F.3d 1199, 1215 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that state courts sometimes enforce 
judgments “that conflict with American foreign policy or are based on foreign law 
that differs substantially from American state or federal law”).  Further, choice-of-law 
principles do not generally differentiate between laws of foreign states and laws of 
foreign nations. See Mathias Reimann, A New Restatement for the International Age, 75 
IND. L.J. 575, 576-77 (2000) (the Second Restatement "postulates that these domestic 
principles and rules apply to disputes involving foreign nations as well, because there 
are no fundamental differences between interstate and international cases . . . .To 
put it bluntly, from the Second Restatement's point of view, it does not matter 
whether the choice is between the law of New York and New Hampshire or between 
the law of New York and New Guinea.") 
 278. See id.; Daniel C. K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law:  
Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165, 181 
(noting that states determine whether foreign laws apply according to their internal 
public policy, often ignoring federal interests). 
 279. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. App. 1977). 
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an equal footing with other sovereigns.280  Under Montana, therefore, 
state courts might be forbidden from applying tribal law at all, or, at a 
minimum, from applying it to disputes that the tribe would not have 
authority to regulate directly. 
Such a conclusion, while tempting, would be incorrect.  Cases such 
as Strate, read carefully, do not explicitly provide that state law must 
apply, or that tribal law may not apply, to nonmembers whose 
conduct has an effect on the well-being of tribes.281  It is clear from 
Montana that tribes may not tax or regulate nonmembers’ use of their 
private land except in special circumstances,282 and it is clear from 
Strate that a tort claim against a nonmember may not be brought in 
tribal court, at least if the tort did not occur on tribal trust land.283  
However, the Supreme Court has never held that, for example, a 
tribal code provision imposing liability for negligent conduct on the 
reservation should have no relevance of any kind to nonmembers.  
On the contrary, the Court has recognized that tribes have some 
stake in the conduct within their borders, even as it has held that this 
interest is generally outweighed by nonmembers’ interest in not 
being subject to the authority of tribal courts.284 
Even in the minority of states that possess jurisdiction over Indian 
country pursuant to P.L. 280, a case can be made that no direct 
federal barrier exists to the application of tribal law, at least in certain 
circumstances, to tribal disputes brought in state court.  This is true 
notwithstanding the fact that the key case on the subject, Bryan v. 
Itasca County,285 provides arguable support for the principle that state 
courts hearing tribal disputes should, at least in P.L. 280 states, apply 
state law.286  In Bryan, the Court considered the scope of civil authority 
over Indian country in states that were granted jurisdiction pursuant 
to P.L. 280.287  While Congress’s primary concern in enacting P.L. 280 
had been to give states a role in punishing criminal conduct on 
                                                          
 280. In Babbitt Ford, the court considered a version of this issue in deciding 
whether to accord a tribe coequal sovereign status.  Id. at 695. 
 281. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (reaffirming 
reservation Indians’ inherent sovereign power over activities of nonmembers to the 
extent necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations, but 
claiming that authority over the state highway accident did not meet these criteria); 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359-65 (2001). 
 282. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
 283. 520 U.S. at 456-57. 
 284. See id. at 459.  This is particularly true because the Court has refused to rule 
out the possibility that tribal regulatory powers might exceed tribal adjudicative 
powers. 
 285. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
 286. The aftermath of 1950s assimilationist politics is reflected in this case.  See 
discussion supra Part I.A (examining assimilationist policies and tribal law generally). 
 287. 426 U.S. at 387-88. 
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reservations, the statute also included hastily drafted civil jurisdiction 
provisions.288  These provided that the participating states “shall have 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which 
Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country 
listed . . . to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over 
other civil causes of action,” and further that the “civil laws of such 
State that are of general application to private persons or private 
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian 
country as they have elsewhere within the State.”289 
Taking the position that this provision authorized the application 
of state law within Indian country,290 Minnesota sought to collect 
personal property tax from a Chippewa Tribe member living on the 
reservation.291  The Bryan Court held that the state lacked authority to 
do so.292  In what is generally hailed as an important victory for tribal 
independence, the Supreme Court narrowly construed P.L. 280’s 
somewhat cryptic civil jurisdiction provisions, holding that the 
jurisdiction granted states was solely adjudicatory and did not permit 
tribes to be “subordinated to the full panoply of [state] regulatory 
powers.”293  Instead, the Court found, the purpose of the civil-
jurisdiction provisions was simply to “redress the lack of adequate 
Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation 
Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by 
permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes.”294 
Bryan’s central holding enabled tribes to preserve a core of distinct 
regulatory authority even in P.L. 280 states.  It has rightfully been 
hailed as a masterly decision by a Court that wished to avoid giving 
                                                          
 288. It is often believed that Congress’s primary impetus in passing P.L. 280 was to 
give states a role in punishing criminal conduct on reservations and that the statute’s 
civil jurisdiction provisions were something of an afterthought.  See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 
379 (citing Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280:  The Limits of State Jurisdiction over 
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 541-42 (1975)). 
 289. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2000). 
 290. The extent to which states can tax transactions by tribe members or otherwise 
regulate conduct within Indian country is a complex issue in its own right.  In 
general, states do not lack all authority to regulate in Indian country, but their 
powers are sharply limited.  States generally do not have power to tax on-reservation 
activity or to regulate the use of tribal lands, although they may have such authority 
over nonmembers on fee lands within a reservation.  See CANBY, supra note 31, at 263-
77.  In P.L. 280 states, state prohibitory laws may apply in Indian country, but state 
regulatory laws generally do not.  See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202, 210 (1987). 
 291. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 375. 
 292. Id. at 377 (determining that Itasca County was prohibited from levying 
property taxes on Bryan’s home in the absence of congressional consent, and P.L. 
280 did not provide the requisite consent). 
 293. Id. at 388. 
 294. Id. at 383. 
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states wholesale authorization to regulate events within Indian 
country while at the same time interpreting P.L. 280 in a way that its 
text could plausibly support.295  Bryan’s more problematic aspect, 
however, is its assumption that state law would apply to state-court 
proceedings involving Indians in P.L. 280 states.  Although the Court 
did not specifically discuss the issue, most commentators have 
assumed that, under Bryan, state law can, and should, apply to 
disputes brought pursuant to P.L. 280.296 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret Bryan as setting 
forth a more general principle that state law should apply to tribal 
matters in state court.  It is first important to note that the Bryan 
Court was dealing with a specific piece of legislation—one that does 
not apply in many states, such as New Mexico, with a large number of 
tribal disputes.  Because of the sweeping language of P.L. 280, it is 
hard to see how the Court could have interpreted P.L. 280 any more 
narrowly than it did.  P.L. 280 plainly gives state law, under some 
circumstances, the same force and effect within Indian country as it 
has in the state at large.  By limiting such laws’ “force and effect” to 
the adjudicative context, the Court ensured that state law would not 
be generally applicable to tribes and that it would apply only when 
tribal litigants, by bringing cases to state court, affirmatively elected 
it.297  Ultimately, therefore, far from establishing a broad mandate for 
the application of state law by state courts, the Court ensured that 
P.L. 280’s commands would have the narrowest possible effect. 
Given this, it is possible to interpret Bryan to allow the application 
of tribal law under limited circumstances to tribal disputes even in 
P.L. 280 states.  Under Bryan, P.L. 280 could be interpreted to allow 
states to apply their “whole law”—that is, in choice-of-law 
terminology, their choice-of-law principles as well as their substantive 
law.298  If states applied their usual choice-of-law principles to P.L. 280 
                                                          
 295. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:  Colonialism, 
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 429-32 
(1993) (describing the Court’s artful construction of “one of the most assimilationist 
laws in the history of federal Indian policy”). 
 296. CANBY, supra note 31, at 245; see also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987) (suggesting that, under P.L. 280, state law would 
apply in private civil litigation).  Note that even when plaintiffs assert state causes of 
action, courts in P.L. 280 states may be required to engage issues of tribal law.  See, 
e.g., Turner v. Martire, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1054-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (finding 
that plaintiffs could assert state-law tort claims against tribal officials against whom 
plaintiff had asserted state-law tort claims were not immune because they had not 
shown that they were acting within the scope of their official duties under tribal law). 
 297. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 387-89. 
 298. See Pearson, supra note 5, at 725 (arguing that, in some cases, courts directed 
to apply a state’s “whole law” might ultimately apply tribal law as a result of that 
state’s choice-of-law principles). 
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actions, such principles could ultimately dictate the application of 
tribal law to the given action.  Though Congress may not have 
explicitly foreseen this result, it is difficult to argue that P.L. 280 
expressly forbids it, given that state choice-of-law principles are as 
much laws of “general application” as tort or contract law.299  Because 
Bryan reaffirms tribes’ continuing regulatory jurisdiction over Indians 
in Indian country, there is a particularly strong case that application 
of tribal law in P.L. 280 states is permissible when such law is applied 
to govern events and transactions that the tribe would have authority 
to regulate, or to contracts in which the application of tribal law is a 
negotiated term.300  Thus, even when a case is brought pursuant to 
P.L. 280 jurisdiction, the possibility of applying tribal law may not be 
entirely foreclosed.  
Of potential significance in this analysis is a little-interpreted 
provision of P.L. 280 that provides that “Any tribal ordinance or 
custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or 
community in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, 
if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given 
full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action 
pursuant to this section.”301 As commentators have noted, this section 
is highly ambiguous; depending on whether “inconsistent” is given a 
broad or a narrow interpretation, it may be either a broad mandate 
for the application of tribal law to situations in which there is no state 
law precisely on point, or a somewhat meaningless gesture of comity 
with little practical effect.302  Nonetheless, the provision is couched in 
mandatory language (“shall  . . . be given full force and effect”) that 
suggests, at the very least, that Congress intended that state courts 
asserting P.L. 280 jurisdiction should be prepared to examine tribal 
                                                          
 299. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (finding 
that choice-of-law principles are substantive state law). 
 300. Notwithstanding the fact that Oregon is a P.L. 280 state, the court in Warm 
Springs never cited P.L. 280 as a reason to apply state law to the tribal contract at 
issue.  The court also seemed to suggest that the parties to a contract could validly 
elect to have tribal law apply under appropriate circumstances.  See Warm Springs 
Forest Prods. Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. 1986). 
 301. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c). 
 302. Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian 
Country:  A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State and Federal 
Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 973, 1026-27 (2000), raises several important 
questions about the meaning of this term, asking, “Is it enough that a tribal law is 
inconsistent with the public policy behind the state's law? Or if the law of the two 
sovereigns are only partially inconsistent, must the court apply the portion of tribal 
law that is not inconsistent? And it is not clear whether the state court has an 
affirmative duty to discover the tribal law or whether the burden is on the parties to 
inform the court of the tribal law.”  See also Canby, supra note 31, at 245 (noting that 
since “most states have relatively complete bodies of civil law,” this provision “did not 
leave much room for tribal law to operate”). 
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sources of law.  This provision, therefore, supports an argument that, 
under appropriate circumstances, it is appropriate for courts in P.L. 
280 states to examine tribal law under state choice-of-law principles. 
B. Application of Tribal Law and Federal Principles of Tribal Autonomy 
While the Montana line of cases has been aimed at shielding 
nonmembers from unwanted assertions of tribal jurisdiction, 
Supreme Court case law has also had another, arguably more 
important goal:  protecting the rights of tribes against states.  Thus, as 
Williams and Fisher indicate, some matters implicating tribes are 
simply inappropriate for adjudication in state court.303  Could the 
same be true, under any circumstances, with regard to state court 
decisions to apply tribal law?  In other words, is it possible that the 
application of tribal law might, in some cases, be preempted under 
federal Indian law on the grounds that it conflicts with tribal 
sovereignty? 
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that the application of state 
law to events that concern tribe members or that take place on 
reservation always interferes, to a greater or lesser extent, with both 
of Williams’ imperatives—that is, that tribes be permitted both to 
“make” their own laws and to “be ruled by” them.  Because the court 
can make a binding decision affecting the tribe in which the tribe has 
no say, the process of adjudication interferes with tribes’ ability to 
“make” their own laws.  Moreover, when state law is applied to 
reservation matters, it also interferes with tribes’ ability to “be ruled 
by” the laws they make, because a sovereign other than the tribe 
determines the law that will govern tribe members’ conduct. 
The equation becomes more complicated, however, when a dispute 
is heard in state court but tribal law applies.  It is certainly true that in 
some cases the application of tribal law by a state rather than a tribal 
court has the potential to undermine the principles announced in 
Williams.  Where a given tribe’s judicial values are fundamentally 
incompatible with state-court adjudication—as may be the case, for 
example, with tribes using nonadversarial dispute resolution 
processes—allowing a state court to hear a case may inevitably distort 
and dilute tribal law, interfering with tribes’ right to make law in the 
                                                          
 303. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (determining that state courts were 
not free to exercise jurisdiction over a civil action by a non-Indian against an Indian 
over a cause of action arising on an Indian reservation); Fisher v. District Court, 424 
U.S. 382, 386 (1976) (restricting jurisdiction of state courts over disputes between 
Indians, absent a governing act of Congress, to state actions that do not infringe on 
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them). 
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manner they might wish.  Similarly, where a tribal forum is available 
but a case is brought in state court, the effect of allowing the state 
court to apply tribal law may be to undermine the tribal court’s 
authority.  In such situations, allowing a state rather than a tribal 
court to apply tribal law is certainly in tension, if not outright conflict, 
with the underlying principles of Williams. 
This line of reasoning, however, rests on the broad assumption that 
a tribal forum is both available and a viable alternative to state court.  
As has been discussed, however, many cases exist in which a tribe has 
legitimate interests in the outcome of a case, but a state court is, for 
jurisdictional or practical reasons, the only forum in which the 
dispute can be heard.304  In such cases, application of tribal law in 
state court actually promotes tribes’ right to “be ruled by” the laws they 
make, by allowing tribes to expand their sphere of influence and 
ensure that tribal standards of conduct are applied to events that 
might affect them.  In other words, where a tribal forum is not readily 
available, the application of tribal law should not be seen as usurping 
the role of the tribal court, but instead as displacing state law that 
would otherwise apply.  Because application of state law to tribal 
matters rarely furthers tribal self-rule, application of tribal law in such 
circumstances is in keeping with Williams’ broad principles. 
Thus, a more productive way of looking at Williams may be as a case 
that is relevant to decisions about which law should apply to a case 
rather than exclusively to decisions about which forum should hear it.  
That is, once state-court jurisdiction is already established, either 
because the Supreme Court has mandated it or an Indian litigant has 
chosen it, the reasoning of Williams should weigh in favor of, not 
against, the application of tribal law.305  Such an interpretation would 
address Williams’ key concerns—ensuring that tribal law is applied to 
tribal matters and that Indian defendants are not required to appear 
in state court against their will.  Yet it would also acknowledge the 
                                                          
 304. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 305. A more radical re-understanding of Williams might be to view it exclusively as a 
choice-of-law case mandating that tribal law apply to reservation-centered 
transactions.  In other words, as long as the tribal defendant does not object to 
adjudication in state court, state adjudication would be permissible so long as tribal 
law applies.  Under such a reading, Williams could also be understood as giving 
Indian defendants (or, perhaps, the tribe itself) a power of removal to tribal court if 
one were available.  Since Williams remains one of the few affirmations of tribal 
sovereignty that is still good law, any revision of its holding carries some danger to 
tribes.  This approach would, however, acknowledge the reality that some state courts 
have pushed the limits of what Williams allows—by, for example, deciding claims by 
and against tribe members so long as some relevant conduct took place off the 
reservation.  See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 549. 
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reality that many cases with tribal contacts are heard by state courts, 
and that the tribe has a continuing stake in those cases. 
A subtler problem in applying tribal law in state court involves the 
implication of precedents that the Court has developed in the federal 
court context.  As the previous section has discussed, the Court has 
generally assumed that state and tribal courts operate in separate 
spheres and will apply separate law, while also acknowledging that, 
under certain circumstances, state and tribal courts might have 
concurrent jurisdiction over the same case.  The Court has given state 
courts little guidance in how to negotiate areas of overlapping 
jurisdiction with tribal courts—what to do, for example, if a litigant 
files suit in tribal court and then proceeds to file another suit, arising 
out of the same facts, in state court.306 
Nonetheless, in cases where the jurisdiction of tribal and federal 
court arguably overlaps, the Court has held that where arguable 
tribal-court jurisdiction exists, a plaintiff can sue in state court only 
after pursuing tribal remedies, including any possible appeals.  
Although the extent of tribal jurisdiction is a question of federal law, 
the Court held in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe307 
that tribal courts must have the opportunity to determine their own 
jurisdiction first; only after a final pronouncement from the tribal 
courts may federal courts engage in a final level of review to 
determine whether the tribal exercise of jurisdiction was proper.308 
In LaPlante,309 the Court clarified that the exhaustion principle 
extended even to cases in which federal jurisdiction was founded in 
diversity.  In such cases, the court found, “unconditional access to the 
federal forum would place it in direct competition with the tribal 
courts, thereby impairing the latter’s authority over reservation 
affairs.”310  Further, the Court observed, “[a]djudication of such 
matters by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law-making 
authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and 
apply tribal law.”311 
Various state court cases have considered the implications of Crow 
Tribe and LaPlante for concurrent state/tribal jurisdiction.312  State 
                                                          
 306. This situation is most likely to arise in P.L. 280 states. 
 307. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
 308. Id. at 857. 
 309. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
 310. Id. at 16. 
 311. Id. 
 312. In a particularly lengthy and scholarly opinion, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court reached the conclusion that state adjudication is permissible in the absence of 
a pending action in the tribal court.  See Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 64 (Conn. 
1998). 
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courts have differed on whether Crow Tribe and LaPlante require state 
court abstention where states and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction 
over a case.313  On the one hand, LaPlante makes clear that tribal 
courts are to be the primary expositors of tribal law, and that 
adjudication by nontribal courts to some extent always impinges on 
tribal sovereignty.314  On the other hand, LaPlante does not speak at 
all to the issue of state jurisdiction, and other Supreme Court cases, 
from Bryan to Wold, contemplate the exercise of concurrent state 
jurisdiction under certain circumstances without articulating an 
equivalent exhaustion principle.315 
In considering the issue, it is important to note, first, that Crow 
Tribe and LaPlante both dealt with a situation in which a suit was 
already pending in tribal court and the tribal court’s jurisdiction was 
thus directly challenged.316  Although the holding of these cases was 
not limited to that situation, some courts have concluded that comity-
based concerns about interference with another sovereign’s 
proceedings are less compelling when no tribal suit has yet been 
filed—even in situations where the tribal court might hypothetically 
have jurisdiction over the case.317  In such cases, state-court 
adjudication might indirectly undermine the power of tribal courts to 
pronounce on reservation affairs, but it does not operate as a direct 
attempt to strip the tribal court of its authority.  While the underlying 
principles of LaPlante counsel caution in any case where concurrent 
tribal jurisdiction exists, an argument can be made that a state court 
should, in limited circumstances, have discretion to hear such cases—
if, for example, the state forum is strongly preferred by an Indian 
plaintiff. 
An even stronger argument can be made that a case in which a 
state court has exclusive jurisdiction should be regarded differently 
from one in which it is exercising concurrent jurisdiction—and thus 
potentially competing with tribal courts.  Indeed, if a tribal court is 
not available or clearly lacks jurisdiction over a case, the exhaustion 
principle of Crow Tribe and LaPlante cannot apply literally—since there 
is, in effect, nothing to exhaust.  In this regard, it is worth noting that 
                                                          
 313. See id. at 64 nn.16-17 (listing cases that conclude that exhaustion of tribal 
remedies is necessary either (1) only in the absence of a pending tribal proceeding, 
or (2) regardless of whether an action is pending in tribal court). 
 314. See supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 303-305 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Drumm, 716 A.2d at 64 (noting that in both Crow Tribe and LaPlante, the 
two Supreme Court cases holding exhaustion was necessary, a tribal court 
proceeding was already pending). 
 317. See id. at 64-65. 
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the Supreme Court has retreated from much of the reasoning on 
which LaPlante rested.318  The Supreme Court’s recent case law has 
not only narrowed the scope of tribal jurisdiction, but ensured that 
tribal and state jurisdiction will remain closely linked in a way that 
tribal and federal jurisdiction are not.  As Strate makes clear, state 
courts have a role to play in adjudicating tribal disputes, picking up 
where tribal jurisdiction ends to provide a forum in which tribe 
members’ claims against nonmembers can be heard.319 
As the Court has limited tribal courts’ power to adjudicate cases 
involving nonmembers, it has become virtually inevitable that many 
cases with substantial tribal contacts will be heard in state court.  
Thus, the main objective of LaPlante—to ensure that tribal courts 
have the primary role in interpreting tribal law—is no longer 
achievable except at the cost of expanding state law’s applicability to 
tribal matters.320 
Attempts to honor the underlying principles of LaPlante321 must 
thus take into account the reality that, in many cases, tribal law must 
be applied in state court or not at all.  Therefore, while LaPlante 
remains an important guidepost for state courts addressing tribal-law 
issues, it should not operate to bar state court consideration of tribal 
law completely. 
C.   Tribal Law and Tribal Interests 
The fact that Supreme Court precedent does not broadly prohibit 
the application of tribal law by state courts does not mean that such a 
practice is always in the best interests of tribes.  Many tribes and 
                                                          
 318. See Reynolds, supra note 7, at 566 (examining the Court’s retreat from the 
reasoning in LaPlante). 
 319. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). 
 320. Many Indian law scholars have sharply criticized the Supreme Court’s post-
Montana case law as unduly restricting tribal sovereignty in ways that lack historical or 
textual basis—a position with which the Author of this Article is sympathetic.  See, 
e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism:  The Judicial Divestiture 
of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).  Defenders of the 
post-Montana state of affairs, however, might counter that Montana serves the 
important function of protecting the settled expectations and due process rights of 
nonmembers.  Whatever the merits of Montana, however, its holding is likely here to 
stay. In fact, the Court has recently expanded Montana’s reach.  It is important to 
emphasize, therefore, that both detractors and supporters of Montana can potentially 
approve of wider state-court application of tribal law.  Those who dislike Montana can 
embrace this outcome as a means of restoring some of the tribal influence Montana 
stripped away; supporters should find it unobjectionable because such adjudication 
would take place in a forum bound (as tribal courts are not) to respect nonmember 
litigants’ constitutional rights. 
 321. The LaPlante Court did not acknowledge that tribal civil jurisdiction was not 
subject to Oliphant, and thus not as restricted as tribal criminal jurisdiction.  480 U.S. 
9, 15 (1987). 
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advocates for tribal rights have been skeptical about application of 
tribal law outside tribal forums and uneasy about the capacity of 
outsider courts to understand Indian cultural norms.  In fact, some 
commentators have argued that application of tribal law outside 
tribal courts poses such grave threats to tribal sovereignty and 
practical problems of proof that state courts should follow a “bright-
line rule” of dismissing cases whenever their choice-of-law principles 
point toward tribal substantive law.322 
There are legitimate reasons for skepticism about the value to 
tribes of having their law applied in state courts.  Commentators have 
worried, first, that state-court adjudication of tribal disputes would 
weaken the power of tribal courts.323  Maintaining a distinctively 
Indian judiciary is important because it allows a tribe’s traditional 
methods of decision-making to survive.  Some tribal court systems, 
such as that of the Cherokee Nation, may be centuries old; such 
courts are generally an integral part of tribal life.324  Even if the tribe 
adopts some Anglo traditions or procedures,325 tribal court is a place 
where the tribe asserts its sovereignty by making and enforcing its 
laws and customs.  State court application of tribal law may interfere 
with these benefits by undermining the work of tribal courts.  
Further, tribal and state courts are to some extent in competition for 
litigants and resources.  If state courts are permitted to apply tribal 
law, such courts may become even more attractive alternatives, luring 
some plaintiffs away from tribal court. 
                                                          
 322. See Harte, supra note 13, at 95 (arguing that “[t]ribal courts, and tribal courts 
alone, should interpret tribal law,” since only tribal courts are equipped to make 
decisions regarding the extent of “what is necessary to protect tribal self-government” 
under the standard announced in Montana).  Further, Harte argues, application of 
tribal law in state court may present insurmountable practical problems:  state and 
tribal courts have significant value differences, and tribal law may be difficult or 
impossible to prove, especially since those most familiar with it are tribal elders who 
“may not speak English or may not be permitted to divulge important tribal ideals in 
an open and alien state courtroom.”  Id. at 92.  Harte acknowledges one danger of 
his approach:  that, rather than dismissing a case, state courts will manipulate their 
choice-of-law principles in order to find that forum law, rather than tribal law, 
applies.  Id. at 99. 
 323. Id. at 92 (arguing that application of tribal laws in the state adversarial system 
would undermine the authority of the tribal court system). 
 324. The courts of the Cherokee Nation claim roots in tribal dispute-resolution 
processes dating back to the 1600s.  The tribe has maintained a formal court system 
intermittently since at least 1839.  See Leeds, supra note 33, at 317-19; Cherokee 
Nation:  Judicial Branch, available at http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section= 
government&branch=judicial. 
 325. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts:  Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. 
L. REV. 225, 250-55 (1994), for a discussion of ways in which tribal courts integrate 
traditional and Anglo-American practices. 
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State courts can also hinder the work of tribal judiciaries in a more 
basic way—by failing to get the law right, or by failing to understand 
the cultural and procedural background that may be integral to the 
law’s application.  This is a particular problem because 
interpretations of tribal law in state court are unlikely to be subject to 
any further level of review.326  Sometimes state courts may be 
overwhelmed by the sheer unfamiliarity of tribal law,327 but judges 
may be also become confused when state and tribal laws superficially 
resemble each other.  Gloria Valencia-Weber, for example, has noted 
that the frequently used tribal tort standard of “carelessness” is subtly 
different from the state-law standard of “negligence” and that 
nontribal courts may blur the distinction.328  Because of the potential 
for this sort of misunderstanding, both Indians and non-Indians 
affected by tribal-law issues may prefer to have tribal law applied by a 
judge who knows it well. 
While these dangers are real, however, they fail to tell the whole 
story.  To begin with, as commercially significant off-reservation 
dealings by tribes and individual Indians become increasingly 
routine, some growth in the proportion of cases implicating tribal 
interests heard in state court is inevitable.329  In fact, under some 
circumstances, cases against non-Indians are funneled to state courts 
by tribal design; some tribal codes do not provide for jurisdiction 
over non-Indians who do not consent to have disputes litigated there, 
meaning that Indian plaintiffs who wish to sue non-Indians must go 
to state court.330  The problem may be even worse in P.L. 280 states, 
since one effect of P.L. 280 has been to impede the development of 
tribal judicial systems in affected states.331  Tribal litigants in P.L. 280 
states, therefore, may find that no tribal forum is available to hear 
                                                          
 326. Harte, supra note 13, at 98. 
 327. Complicated issues of establishing the content of tribal law arose, for 
example, in John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska 2001), and People by Abrams v. Anderson, 
529 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
 328. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 325, at 255-56 (comparing “carelessness” to 
“negligence” and noting that, among other differences, “carelessness” does not 
require a detailed analysis of elements such as duty and standard of care). 
 329. As tribes and individual Indians enter into more commercial transactions off 
the reservation and exclusively on-reservation transactions become less frequent and 
less important, off-reservation transactions will be of greater importance to the tribes.  
Despite the obvious tribal interests in these transactions, any disputes arising from 
off-reservation contacts will often be under the jurisdiction of the state court.  
Reynolds, supra note 7, at 559. 
 330. See CANBY, supra note 31, at 213 (noting that some tribes assert jurisdiction 
only over tribal defendants).  Given the uncertain and shifting boundaries of tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers, it is understandable that many tribes might prefer to 
err on the side of simplicity and caution. 
 331. See Vanessa J. Jiminez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent State and Tribal Jurisdiction 
under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1636-37 (1998). 
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their case.332  Where state courts essentially have exclusive jurisdiction 
by default, concerns about competition with tribal courts are largely 
inapplicable. 
In such circumstances, state-court application of tribal law can 
allow tribes to have some voice in a wider array of cases.  As Laurie 
Reynolds has argued, neither tribes or tribal courts will benefit by the 
principle that “state courts may freely ignore tribal interests in any 
dispute displaying off-reservation contacts.”333  As the sphere in which 
tribes can directly assert power over nonmembers has diminished, 
some tribes have come to reject the absolutist ideal of sovereign 
autonomy—what Robert Laurence has wryly described as “the 
increasingly unfettered power to do less and less.”334  Basically, for 
some tribes, the exclusive right to have tribal laws interpreted in 
tribal court may be less important than the ability to exert influence 
over transactions that affect tribal lands and communities—a goal 
that may be best accomplished by allowing state and federal courts to 
apply tribal law. 
In addition to such lesser-of-two-evils rationales for applying tribal 
law, there may be more affirmative benefits to tribes.  Application of 
tribal law may foster a greater sense of cooperation between tribal 
and state courts, permitting state courts a basic understanding of 
tribal procedures that may help reduce suspicion and 
miscommunication when the state court is asked to grant full faith 
and credit to tribal judgments or stay its proceedings in favor of a 
related suit in tribal court.  Such cooperation is likely to become 
increasingly important as tribes’ economic well-being becomes more 
and more dependent on finding fair and efficient ways to resolve 
cases that span reservation boundaries.  When multimillion-dollar 
disputes arise between tribal corporations and their contracting 
partners—as is increasingly likely in the age of tribal gaming—both 
parties’ interests are served when the judicial system as a whole is able 
to minimize opportunities for forum-shopping and inconsistent 
results.335 
                                                          
 332. See Thorington, supra note 302, at 1035 (discussing problems that can arise 
when no tribal forum exists). 
 333. Reynolds, supra note 7, at 559. 
 334. Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated 
Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation 
Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979, 981 (1995).  See J.R. Mueller, Restoring Harmony 
through Nalyeeh:  Can the Navajo Common Law of Torts be Applied in State and Federal 
Forums?, 2 TRIBAL L.J. 3 (2001-2002), for a discussion of this shift in attitude among 
some tribes and arguments advocating the increased application of Navajo tort-law 
principles in nontribal forums. 
 335. See Thorington, supra note 302, at 1032 (discussing the confusion and 
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It is also important to note that it is far from impossible for state 
courts to apply tribal law carefully and accurately.  Although certain 
elements of tribal law may be as arcane and complex as state courts 
have sometimes feared, disputes that find their way into state court 
are more likely to involve principles of tribal tort and commercial law 
than complicated matters of internal tribal relations.336  In such cases, 
while the applicable tribal law may not mirror exactly the law of any 
given state, it is likely to present the sort of conflicts with which state 
courts are familiar—issues such as what damages are available to a 
plaintiff,337 whether a judicial process must precede repossession of 
property,338 or whether an oral contract modification is enforceable.339  
Moreover, even when the legal issues involved are less 
straightforward, finding and establishing the content of tribal law in 
state court need not be complicated.  State reforms in recent years 
have made establishing the content of foreign law easier in general 
by, for example, allowing courts to take judicial notice of such law 
rather than requiring it to be proven.340  In addition, the court 
systems of many larger tribes are increasingly well-financed and well-
established, often with extensive, Web-searchable libraries of 
decisions or equivalent resources.341 
Further, the legitimate concerns about application of tribal law in 
state court might be better addressed by developing strategies to 
funnel certain cases and issues into tribal court, rather than banning 
state-court application of tribal law entirely.  State courts can, for 
example, give tribal courts preference in deciding tribal disputes, 
while remaining willing to apply tribal law where the tribal court is 
inconvenient or unavailable.  Courts can also develop procedural 
                                                          
opportunity for forum-shopping that results from the inconsistent application of 
tribal law). 
 336. This is likely to be the case because the jurisdiction of state courts over 
internal tribal matters is sharply limited.  See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 
382, 386 (1976); see also Cohen, supra note 24, § 6.04[3][b], at 554-55 (noting that 
state courts exercising jurisdiction under P.L. 280 have declined jurisdiction over 
internal tribal disputes such as elections). 
 337. Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302-05 (D.N.M. 1999). 
 338. Tempest Recovery Servs. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 68-69 (N.M. 2003). 
 339. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 716 P.2d 
740, 741 (Or. 1986). 
 340. See, e.g., id. at 742-43 (discussing wider availability of judicial notice for 
foreign law); Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, Art. IV 
(authorizing courts, in determining the content of foreign law, to “consider any 
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party 
or admissible under the rules of evidence”). 
 341. For example, the National Tribal Justice Resource Center maintains a 
searchable database of codes, constitutions, by-laws, and judicial opinions from more 
than fifty tribes.  See Tribal Justice Resource Center, available at http://www.tribal 
resourcecenter.org. 
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mechanisms to facilitate consideration of tribal-law issues in state 
court while insuring that states do not infringe on tribal autonomy.  
For example, many commentators have advocated increased use of 
certification procedures for tribal-law questions.342  A few tribes 
already have enacted laws permitting state and federal judges to 
certify questions to their courts,343 and some nontribal courts have 
entertained plaintiffs’ requests to certify issues of tribal law to tribal 
courts.344  In the tribal law setting, certification presents an ideal 
opportunity for state courts to become familiar with tribal decision-
making processes in a neutral, mutually respectful context.  
Certification would be particularly useful in situations where tribal 
substantive law is closely intertwined with procedure; in such cases, 
tribes could preserve the integrity of traditional decision-making 
processes while retaining influence in the outcome of state-court 
cases. 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens or other discretionary 
abstention doctrines may also be useful for achieving similar ends in 
cases where a tribal forum is available to hear a case initially brought 
in state court.345  A finding of forum non conveniens allows a court to 
discretionarily dismiss a case when the forum of a different 
jurisdiction is better situated—for both practical and cultural 
reasons—to hear it.  In international contexts, courts consider several 
central factors in deciding whether to dismiss the case on the ground 
of forum non conveniens, including issues pertaining to the private 
interests of the litigants, such as ease of access to sources of proof, the 
cost of obtaining witnesses, and other practical issues, as well as 
public factors such as the avoidance of the application of foreign law 
and the interest in “having localized controversies decided at 
home.”346  Many of these factors will often be present in the Indian-
law context as well because the state court may be distant 
geographically from tribal occurrences and may be wholly unfamiliar 
with tribal law, and parties may find it difficult to bring witnesses to a 
sometimes-distant state court. 
                                                          
 342. See Tebben, supra note 263, at 185. 
 343. See Pommersheim, supra note 342, at 168 n.172 (citing Mille Lacs Band Stat. 
Ann. tit. 24, § 3001 (1996), which uses language similar to section 3 of the widely 
enacted state Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, and Hopi Tribal Code 
§ 1.2.8 (1992)). 
 344. See Bryant ex rel. Bryant v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956-57 (D. Ariz. 
2000) (considering request for certification of questions of Navajo law to the Navajo 
Supreme Court, but ultimately concluding that tribal law did not apply to the case). 
 345. See generally Harte, supra note 13. 
 346. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). 
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Because forum non conveniens allows courts to consider a variety of 
factors particular to the individual case, it provides a great deal of 
flexibility to individual judges.  Further, since forum non conveniens 
determinations are often made contingent on the availability of an 
alternative forum,347 the doctrine also allows state courts to permit 
tribal courts a first chance to consider difficult issues of tribal law 
while retaining the prerogative to hear the case if no tribal forum 
proves to be available. 
Finally, the choice-of-law process itself affords opportunities for 
states to take tribal interests into consideration.  Tribes that value 
internal decision-making procedures, fear competition from state 
courts, or worry about distortion of tribal law in the hands of 
outsiders can adopt a formal policy opposing state-court application 
of their law.  Tribes could also, of course, sanction the application of 
certain areas of tribal law (commercial law, for example) by state 
courts, while specifying that other aspects of tribal law (such as those 
touching on family relations) are matters of internal tribal relations 
to be decided by the tribe alone.  Because most choice-of-law regimes 
allow state courts to take public policy issues into account when 
deciding which sovereign’s law to apply,348 state courts would be able 
to consider the preferences of tribes when deciding whether or not to 
apply tribal law.  State courts would also have an additional incentive 
to avoid the application of tribal law when it is contrary to the tribe’s 
preference, since there is a greater danger that such a practice would 
violate the tribe’s right to “make [its] own laws and to be ruled by 
them,” hence running afoul of the central principle of Williams. 
As a last note, any argument that state application of tribal law will 
lead to conflict or misunderstanding must grapple with the fact that 
many state courts have already committed themselves to a process of 
interpreting tribal law in an area in which issues of cross-cultural 
understanding are likely to prove far more problematic.  Many state 
courts refuse to give automatic full faith and credit to tribal 
judgments.349  Instead, procedures in the majority of states dictate that 
state courts must examine tribal judgments for fairness and 
procedural regularity before deciding whether or not to enforce 
them.  To take a representative statute, Wisconsin allows state courts 
to examine tribal judgments based on a number of criteria, including 
                                                          
 347. See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991). 
 348. See id. at 16; cf. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing public policy 
considerations in context of enforcing foreign rulings and decrees). 
 349. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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whether they were “procured in compliance with procedures 
required by the rendering court.”350 
Ironically, such requirements often require state courts to examine 
tribal law far more extensively than would be necessary if they were to 
apply directly a substantive point of tribal law. Suppose, for example, 
that the party resisting enforcement of a tribal judgment contends 
that the tribal judge violated standards of due process by applying a 
tribal ordinance inconsistently in his case.351  In order to assess the 
validity of that claim, the court must have at least a general 
understanding of the content of that ordinance and the procedures 
by which it is normally applied.  The court must also be able to review 
the tribal proceedings in the individual case to determine whether 
the tribal court applied those procedures in a fashion inconsistent 
with usual practice.  Making such determinations on a reasonably 
principled basis, therefore, may require the court to immerse itself 
thoroughly in the details of tribal law.   
By contrast, where state conflict-of-law principles dictate the 
application of tribal law, the issues are likely to be less complex.352  By 
definition, tribal issues that appear in state court virtually always 
involve a mix of on-reservation and off-reservation contacts.  Where 
tribal law on the subject exists, therefore, it is often law that the tribe 
                                                          
 350. WIS. STAT. § 806.245(4)(e) (1994). 
 351. This brief discussion does not even consider the question of whether Anglo-
American notions of due process should necessarily be applied as a standard by 
which to measure proceedings in tribal courts.  Many tribes adhere to cultural 
principles that are, in fact, inconsistent with those notions.  Some tribal judicial 
systems, for example, may emphasize repairing relationships among the parties 
rather than determining winners and losers.  Guided by such principles, certain 
tribes may see little problem with, for example, the existence of personal ties 
between the judge and one or both parties—even though this situation would 
certainly offend Anglo-American due process norms.  For an example of how tribes 
may embrace different models of due process, see John v. Baker, 30 P.3d 68 (Alaska 
2001). 
 352. There are, of course, exceptions.  In People by Abrams v. Anderson, 137 A.D.2d 
259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), for example, a New York State court exercised jurisdiction 
over an intratribal dispute pursuant to a unique federal provision, 25 U.S.C. §§ 232-
233, which grants New York courts jurisdiction over “civil actions and proceedings 
between Indians.”  The case arose out of a bitter intratribal dispute about a bingo 
hall operated by an unincorporated association of tribal members.  Id. at 262.  The 
bingo hall’s operators argued that it was authorized by tribal custom; the tribe’s 
Council of Chiefs, however, argued that the hall was illegal under an 1885 tribal law 
prohibiting gambling.  Id.  The dispute ultimately descended into violence and 
chaos, and it seems unlikely that the New York courts’ ultimate resolution of the 
case—which supported the bingo hall operators despite the fact that the federal 
government recognized the Council of Chiefs as the tribes’ governing authority and 
supported their position that the bingo hall was illegal—did much to restore tribal 
harmony.  Because Abrams involved a hotly contested and wholly internal tribal 
dispute, there is a strong case that the state courts should have dismissed it (or 
attempted to refer it to some form of tribal resolution) on public policy grounds. 
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has enacted in the knowledge that it may be applied to dealings with 
nonmembers.  For that very reason, it may be more closely tailored to 
off-reservation situations and more easily translated into Anglo 
norms.  It is notable that most of the cases discussed in this Article do 
not involve fundamental cultural clashes, but more mundane and 
familiar tort, contract, and property disputes between individual 
litigants.353   Relative to the complicated procedural matters that state 
courts often encounter in the full faith and credit context, these 
issues are likely to be relatively straightforward. 
CONCLUSION 
A place exists for tribal law in state courts.  Even allowing for the 
unusual features of tribal sovereignty, state choice-of-law principles, 
applied neutrally and consistently, should frequently point to tribal 
law as the decisional law in many cases.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision to treat the problem of cases with mixed state and tribal 
contacts as solely a question of jurisdiction and forum choice has 
obscured the potential a choice-of-law approach offers to advance the 
interests of tribes and resolve the procedural dilemmas of litigants.  
As long as proper safeguards are in place, state courts should be 
encouraged to analyze cases involving tribal contacts in choice-of-law 
terms. 
 
                                                          
 353. See section II.B.3 supra (describing several examples of state courts’ 
experiences with cases implicating tribal law. 
